Engaging Communities:

Evaluating Social Accountability in School Feeding Programmes

Charley Johnson[1]

Emily Janoch[1]

22 March 2011

Abstract

This policy brief addresses the question of how implementers of Home Grown School Feeding systems can create and operationalize feedback systems between communities, governments and external partners to ensure Home Grown School Feeding Programmes are meeting communities' needs.

[1] Harvard Kennedy School of Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Question: How can implementers of Home Grown School Feeding systems create and operationalize feedback systems between communities, governments, and external partners that ensures the Home Grown School Feeding Programmes are meeting communities' needs?

Framing: Community participation and downward accountability depend on a system of actors, institutions, and incentives. In order to ensure that the programme responds to a community problem, essential stakeholders—here defined as the community, the funding and/or implementing partners, and the government—need to be involved in four steps. Community involvement in these processes not only makes the programmes more effective and increases their impact, but also increases programme legitimacy.

- Defining needs
- Designing the intervention or service
- Day-to-day programme management
- Evaluating the success of the intervention

In each of these steps, an implementer has a choice of engagement strategies that may either be passive or active.

Findings: The existing diagnostic tools provide a useful picture of what obstacles there are to community engagement. The field studies indicate that there are four main areas that can create obstacles to community engagement and downward accountability:

- Policy Frameworks: the legal systems, agreements between partners, and institutional arrangements that surround school feeding programming and the actors within it;
- Procurement Systems: the methods by which food arrives in communities;
- Communications: how different kinds of partners communicate with each other, and how national, district, and community level partners communicate across these levels; and
- Monitoring and Evaluation: who collects information, what kind of information goes into monitoring a programme, and how actors chose to share and use this information.

Recommendations: There are some recommendations that apply to school feeding programmes broadly, and case specific recommendations, which depend largely on the particular roadblocks that exist in that system. On a more general level, the recommendations are:

Diagnosing Community Engagement Problems:

- Use the provided diagnostic tools in a broad section of communities to identify specific obstacles in the system;
- Conduct interviews with different stakeholders at different implementation levels in separate sessions to get a clear picture of the wide variety of viewpoints that exist in the system; and
- Be as context-specific as possible when designing strategies to solve problems.

Policy Frameworks: In order to be effective, policy frameworks need to be consistent, inclusive, and implementable. Implementers may achieve this by:

- Creating and publicising transparent, consistent, and apolitical criteria and processes for community selection, provider hiring, and regular funding disbursement;
- Negotiating a set of operational systems that all implementing partners agree to adopt;
- Defining and communicating "local" in a clear and consistent way;
- Strengthening ties between school feeding and agriculture at all levels, and
- Fully implementing the existing policy frameworks.

Procurement Systems:

- Develop transparent and consistent procurement procedures across country programmes and partners;
- Move towards community directed procurement whenever possible; and
- Design a readily accessible complaints procedure for procurement problems.

Communications:

- Create widely distributed and community-legible communications strategies about programme goals, resources, and actors;
- Improve communications between different kinds of stakeholders; and
- Build more effective communications systems between the national and local levels.

Monitoring and Evaluation: who collects information, what kind of information goes into monitoring a programme, and how actors chose to share and use this information.

- Involve the communities in all parts of the M&E process; and
- Treat M&E processes as two-way communication and an opportunity to improve programming rather than simply collect data.

There are country-specific recommendations in each of the case studies.

Roadmap: This report has four main parts:

1) A **survey of the importance of community engagement and accompanying tools** to diagnose community engagement in school feeding projects. This includes a literature review surveying concepts about the importance of and challenges to building genuine community engagement into development programming. This section both explains the benefits of downward accountability and outlines ways to evaluate and strengthen community engagement. Researchers have field-tested the accompanying tools in Ghana and Mali, which led to two case studies and a refining of the diagnostic tools. This is to ensure that the tools are efficient and useable across different community and policy settings.
2) A **case study about Ghana** that uses the developed diagnostic tools to assess community engagement and downward accountability in the Ghana School Feeding Programme (GSFP) and provides recommendations for how to improve the programme.
3) A **Mali case study**, which parallels the Ghana case study, and makes recommendations about Mali's school feeding programme.
4) **Broader recommendations** for community engagement in school feeding.

REPORT METHODOLOGY

There are two primary methods of analysis: a literature review and case studies. The literature review covers ideas about accountability in the practice of school feeding and parallel cases (ie: health service delivery or agriculture extension work), as well as questions of leadership in getting governments and communities to adopt new programs and accountability measures. There is a particular focus on the theory and benefits of downward accountability and community engagement, and how governments and external partners can think about diagnosing their current practices and implementing methods to improve their accountability. The literature review draws from a wide variety of theory and practice, both in the anti-corruption and NGO accountability spheres. It also examines particular cases, including Angola, Brazil, and India to look at different systems currently in play, both in school feeding and in other cases.

Additionally, there are two case studies: one for Ghana and one for Mali. These cover aspects of a programme that is just starting and trying to develop accountability systems (Mali) and how to render those systems more effective once they are in place (Ghana). For both case studies, the researchers conducted in-depth interviews with different communities, policy makers, and stakeholders in both the capital and in areas of operation to get a clear picture of how the system works and could be improved. The researchers generated the tools for this process out of the literature review and the current practice for examining community-partner communication and engagement. For the tools that were used in the first iteration of field study, see Appendix B

This process of interviews and fieldwork not only led to a diagnostic of the situation in both countries, but also served to field-test and refine the tools to use for future study. The refined research tools are in Appendix C.

It is important to note that this is a qualitative study rather than a quantitative one, and that this report makes no effort to extrapolate its finding into generalizeable statistical results. Rather,

based on the sample populations, it is possible to draw conclusions and recommendations for future programming, both in the case study countries and for HGSF more broadly. Figure 1 includes a description of the sample size for various kinds of stakeholders

Figure 1: Sample Populations

Actors	**Number Interviewed**	
	Ghana	**Mali**
Government technicians at the directorate level	13	1
Ministry coordinators	0	3
Technical partner's field staff	11	1
Ministry officials at the decentralized level	2	5
School Management Committees	0	17
School Headmasters	2	19
Caterers/food preparers	10	4
Teachers	8	2
Parent organizations	10	3
Farmers and Farmers Organizations	10	1

Typically a review of this kind would also include the perspective of students in schools, and the research tools could apply to children as stakeholders. This report does not cover student perspectives because of restraints that Harvard's Human Subjects Review Board put on the research design for publishable, academic research.

See each case study for further details about methodologies and subjects interviewed in each country.

PART 1: APPRECIATING AND DIAGNOSING COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

This section both explains the benefits of downward accountability and outlines ways to evaluate and strengthen community engagement. It includes a literature review that surveys concepts about the importance of and challenges to building genuine community engagement into development programming. It also includes a set of issues to consider while evaluating community engagement specifically in the school feeding context. Working from the existing literature and issues to consider, the section proposes a set of diagnostic tools for community engagement in school feeding programmes (Appendix B). After field-testing the tools in Ghana and Mali, the researchers made adjustments to improve the tools, and have included the improved tools in Appendix C.

Development programmes, particularly those with multiple sources of financial and technical support, face particular challenges of accountability because of their diverse stakeholder groups and the unequal distribution of power among those groups. Accountability towards funders and regulators, who are powerful, often takes the place of accountability to the communities served. This divide between the source of resources and the community served causes particular tension for development programmes in terms of accountability: resource providers and regulatory systems are powerful stakeholders who can compel different kinds of accountability (upward accountability); communities served are typically by definition powerless (or less powerful), and therefore have little ability to compel a response (downward accountability).

School feeding and Home Grown School Feeding[1] programmes in sub Saharan Africa typically show this tensions between stakeholders with different interests, capacities, and levels of power. The two countries that this report covers, Ghana and Mali, exemplify this set of tensions. In both countries, the programme funders are a combination of national governments, bilateral donors, and international donors such as WFP. The implementing actors are likewise diverse, encompassing government officials at all levels, NGO actors in the capital and in the field, and actors from multilateral groups. Both governments have regulatory frameworks in place, with varying degrees of implementation. Finally, in both cases, the policies around school feeding programmes expressly target the poorest, most disenfranchised communities with high food insecurity and low educational achievement. These systems exactly demonstrate the tensions in development programming that make downward accountability challenging. Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, and Nigeria are three other countries that demonstrate a similar diversity of stakeholders at all levels, and there are many others.[i]

These tensions, while difficult, are not insurmountable. There are options available to both provide downward accountability and to push the disparate stakeholders towards a more aligned set of accountability frameworks. By using a series of tools available and investing institutional will, it is possible to be accountable to the beneficiary communities (downward accountability), even in the face of competing pressures from funders and governments (upward accountability).

[1] Home Grown School Feeding (HGSF) refers to buying the food and inputs—labor, fuel, etc—for a school-feeding program locally wherever possible. This has the additional benefit of creating a demand for food and agricultural products in the local market, and expanding the market itself to provide for this demand. Because in most developing countries school feeding targets all of the children in a particular school, there is a substantial amount of purchasing power available through these programs. Using this purchasing power to strengthen local markets and generate demand adds another dimension of benefit to these programs, in addition to the nutritional support they provide.

FRAMEWORK

In order to discuss accountability, it is helpful to have a working definition and a framework for thinking about different parties in the system. Goodin defines accountability as the responsibility of an actor to another actor for a specific goal.[ii] An actor is accountable when she proves to the second party that she has fulfilled her stated responsibility/met the goal.

Definitions

For the purposes of this paper, the actor who is responsible is the implementing body of the development programme. This may be a government entity, an NGO, a consortium of funders, or some other organization tasked with providing the service in question. The people to whom they are responsible are the stakeholders. For nearly all school feeding programmes, the stakeholders to whom an actor is accountable and the people on whose behalf it carries out its mission and activities are not always—or even often—the same. Brown and Moore lay out the most common set of stakeholders to whom NGOs are accountable: donors, beneficiaries, staff, partners, and targets.[iii] It is useful to add regulators to this list given the power that they have over most development programming. For the purposes of school feeding programmes and the partnerships involved, donors, beneficiaries, partners and regulators are the most common stakeholders to consider.

- Donors are the people and organizations which give money to the programme to carry out its activities;
- Beneficiaries receive services;
- Partners are any people or groups that work with the programme to accomplish its stated goals;
- Regulators are the members (usually the government) of the environment that sets regulations and laws around how NGOs must behave in a particular country or community; and,

The primary difficulty is that not all of these stakeholders have the same interest, and in many cases the interests are extremely misaligned. Additionally, not all stakeholders who wish to demand accountability have the same power to compel action or the ability to reach the programme's decision-makers.

This means that even in the best-intentioned programmes, accountability will skew towards the donors and regulators, since they have the most control over programme existence. One example of this is the way most development programmes data collection and evaluation indicators are geared for donors' needs.[iv] The next most powerful groups are members and partners, followed by beneficiaries. Most programmes have the stated mission of serving beneficiaries, but these are the people who are least able to demand accountability, and least able to consume the kinds of information programme staff generate under the heading of accountability. This gap is especially true in development programmes that have poverty alleviation in extremely rural and disenfranchised populations as the primary goal.

Why worry about community engagement?

Community engagement is a primary mechanism for ensuring downward accountability. There are three ways to view downward accountability. Parfitt lays out two perspectives: as a means and as an end.

Means

Much of the literature lays out reasons to believe that downward accountability serves as a means to better programming and results in the field.[v] In theory, communities that are more

involved in programming—either through the review process or in decision-making—because it increases community ownership over and buy-in to programs and services. [vi] This may happen through two mechanisms: increased involvement and uptake, and increase monitoring and accountability.

- **Involvement and Uptake**: Communities that feel they have more control over and engagement in programming are more likely to support the programme work that communities that are not aware of and involved in the process. Many studies point to the fact that more engagement and more uptake lead to better results.[vii] Beneficiaries who are more engaged in programmes can tailor programmes to meet their needs, as seen in improved girls' attendance in schools when women in the community pushed for female teachers and separate girls' latrines in rural Pakistan.[viii]

- **Monitoring:** Another common reason for involving the community is to have community members serve as monitors who can ensure better service provision and whistle-blowers who can expose cases where money has not reached the village. Bjorkman and Svensson's 2009 study in Uganda shows that in communities where NGOs focused on community engagement in health care, there were better results through increased community monitoring of health care services.[ix] The same impacts show in communities that monitor teacher absenteeism and see both teachers and students coming to school more often.[x] Community report cards for hospitals in Bangalore, India showed improved satisfaction on the part of the community after communities were allowed to have a role in monitoring the services.[xi]

  By having the community monitor what happens in the field and report back, the programme can save manpower and effort in trying to ensure that money is going to appropriate recipients. Many governments, NGOs, and donors advocate for participation because they think it will lead to better results, and more cost-effective implementation, as well as less corruption in programming.

Ends: The literature also views downward accountability as an end: a public good by itself, rather than a way to meet goals. Viewing downward accountability as an end acknowledges a shift of power away from the donor and toward the community.[xii] To accomplish this goal,

development programme donors and implementers need to make real changes in the way their power structures are set up. This stems from the view that downward accountability should be a programme goal, rather than a tool that furthers other goals.

These reasons are cause to treat downward accountability in a serious way, and provide ample justification for programme implementers to push for more downward accountability in its programming. Almost all programmes acknowledge one or more of these viewpoints, and therefore ought to be pushing for more downward accountability in their work.

Challenges in achieving downward accountability

Limited Resources: Programmes operate in a perpetual context of extremely limited financial, capacity, and human resources. This makes it extremely difficult to meet all stakeholders' demands, especially as the tools to assess and account for downward demand are relatively new and experimental. Credible and longstanding tools exist to be accountable to financial and regulatory partners. It is both easier and more important for their existence for programmes to please those actors that have financial and regulatory power over them.[xiii] However, as a Public Expenditures Tracking Survey in Uganda found, providing communities with accessible information about what programmes should and do provide can lead to significant cost savings. In fact, in communities that had access to information saw a decrease in leakage from 80 cents on every educational dollar the government spent to 18 cents.[xiv] In this light, organizations with limited resources cannot afford to overlook community engagement at an important factor in their work.

Results vs. Process A further difficulty is the question of process versus results focus[xv]. Most donors are results-focused, and push for their money to be spent in a cost-effective way. For them, this typically means that the maximum amount possible should go into project expenses

with guaranteed, or at least expected, results, rather than long-term capacity building or investment. Even though there are arguments to support the idea that downward accountability will improve results, creating downward accountability is a process, and one that takes significant time and resources.

Transparency Alone is Insufficient: There is no proven link that merely providing information to a community will allow that community to hold NGOs responsible for their actions and promises.[xvi] Transparency and communication are a necessary step to all downward accountability measures, and arguably the easiest first step for an organization to take, but without a serious organizational commitment to listening to the community's needs and concerns based on the information it receives, and a programme is not being accountable simply by communicating. Information must be presented in a way that is useful to the community, and on which they can act if they are not satisfied.[xvii]

Cementing Dysfunction: A final challenge in this process is that downward accountability mechanisms can cement dysfunctional power dynamics at the community level if larger programmes and outside partners are not careful to look for and listen to different viewpoints. Communities are not monolithic, and if an implementer merely speaks to those who hold the most power—the chief, elders, elected officials, etc—it runs the risk of further disenfranchising the most powerless people that it set out to serve.

CURRENTLY EXISTING DOWNWARD ACCOUNTABILITY METHODS

By definition, downward accountability is about including the community in the process in some way: either by sharing information with them at various stages in the process or by working with the community to determine its priorities in order to shape programming. The literature on downward accountability and community engagement and the field research for this report indicate that there are four main phases in a school feeding programme where the communities could be involved: defining needs, designing interventions, daily management, and monitoring

and evaluation. These are clear steps in the process that leads to creating and sustaining school feeding mechanisms.

Additionally, we propose that it is useful to group existing community engagement interventions into two categories to accurately reflect the situation on the ground. These categories help organize what kind of interventions the programme does or could carry out.

- **Passive participation** schemes generally provide information to citizens about different program strategies or results as a mechanism for voters to know what was supposed to have happened—for example, the amount of money that was dedicated to building a community well, or the number of days the local school should be open—and allow them to make complaints accordingly. The main currency of passive participation schemes is information and communication.

- **Active participation** requires not only sharing information with the community, but also asking for and incorporating their feedback. This might be a participatory budgeting process or a set of participatory assessments that feed into setting a district-level development plan.

While there are currently no articles using this typology, our hypothesis is that active participation schemes—where community input shapes programming—allows for better impacts and more sustainable programmes. The successful examples of community engagement improving impact, such as the increase in female students in Pakistan in communities where the implementer accounted for the community's expressed preference for female teachers, seem to be mostly on the active side.[xviii]

With these two factors in mind, Figure 2 lays out a variety of policy options and where they fall according to the passive-active and define-design-manage-review axes. Implementers trying to improve community engagement will want to first locate the phase in which they see problems with community engagement, and choose a strategy appropriate to that phase. The strategies

listed in Figure 2 come from an extensive review of the existing literature and the tools that many actors are currently using to improve their community engagement. Appendix G provides a more complete description of the various choices available to policy makers. It includes not only descriptions of these strategies, but also success stories and cases of how and when implementers have chosen to use them.

Figure 2: Possible Participation Strategies

	Passive	***Active***
Definition	- Baseline surveys - Using census/government community data	- Participatory Rural Assessment (PRA) - Community request procedures
Design	- Community Targeting	- Participatory Budgeting - Listen First
Management	- Communications strategies - Regular extension-agent visits	- Community or School-Based Management Committees
Review	- Communications Strategies	- Community Monitoring - Community Scorecards

TOOLS TO EXAMINE DOWNWARD ACCOUNTABILITY IN SCHOOL FEEDING

Based on the literature review, and a working knowledge of the basic mechanics of many school feeding programmes, the researchers developed a set of diagnostic tools in English and French to diagnose the current state of downward accountability and community engagement in school feeding programmes. These questionnaires exist for both policy makers and community

members, and take into account the variety of issues that the preceding sections cover, and draw on the ideas in existing community engagement tools. In particular, the tools examine:

- The quality, extent, and mechanisms of communication between communities and decision-makers;
- Communities' involvement in designing the programme and defining the needs the programme addresses;
- The ability of communities to influence programme decisions on both local and national levels;
- The decision-making and problem-solving structures in place;
- The communities' involvement in managing the programme;
- Relative sources of financing for programming;
- The network of stakeholders and partners that work with the programme, and
- The monitoring and evaluation systems in place, and how they involve the community level.

The original set of tools is in Appendix B. After fifteen days of field-testing each in Ghana and Mali, the researchers adapted the tools to maximise their effectiveness both at the community and policy levels, and to increase their appropriateness for school feeding programmes in particular. The revised tools are available in Appendix C.

Ideally, to conduct a diagnosis of community engagement in a school feeding programme, researchers would apply these tools by implementing the questionnaires, interviewing the maximum number of central policy makers available, and then selecting a random sample of the communities involved in the programme. At the community level, it is important to interview the stakeholders involved. The community-level tools are designed to be conducted in focus groups with different stakeholder groups within each community. This may be difficult for practical reasons, but it avoids the risk of having the community engagement process cement power dynamics where only a few powerful people in a community speak for the whole. Some important stakeholders to consider when setting up community focus groups are:

- School Headmasters;
- School management committees;
- Caterers/food preparers;
- Teachers;
- Parent organizations;
- Farmers and Farmers Organizations;
- Vendors involved in selling food to programmes;
- Village heads;
- School Children[2]
- Women's organizations—this is particularly important, since in many places women will not speak up with their concerns if there are men in the group answering questions.

The policy-maker tools are more suited to one-on-one interviews with a variety of policy makers at the national and regional levels, and those with technical expertise implementing the programme. Some important stakeholders to consider here are:

- Government technicians at the directorate level;
- Coordinators/ point persons in the relevant ministries (Agriculture, Education, Health, etc.)
- Programme field coordinators;
- The field staff of donors and technical partners;
- Ministry officials at the decentralized level;
- Donor organizations

RECCOMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE DIAGNOSTIC TECHNIQUES

After extensive field-testing, several changes were made to the evaluation tools to improve community understanding and streamline the process of gathering information from focus groups. For the finalized research tools, see Appendix C. The tools exist in both English and French for broad use across sub Saharan Africa. There are also a few important points to keep in mind when applying this research methodology.

[2] As previously noted, this study did not interview school children due to limitations on a Human Subjects Review process, but they are still an important stakeholder for implementers to consider.

- **Interview focus groups with different perspectives separately**: For reasons of timing and logistics, in some communities there was one interview held with member of the CGS, elected officials, parents' groups, and farmers. While this was necessary given the timing of the project, this risks cementing the perspectives of a few people as the entire community viewpoint, and could create dysfunction when designing programming. This is especially true for women's groups, since in many rural contexts women will not contradict men in a public setting. This will help avoid cementing dysfunction in community engagement mechanisms.

- **Be aware of tradeoffs when having a government official convene the meeting**: In the case of the Mali research, a national and district official were present for all of the interviews. For logistical reasons, this is an important process. It provides credibility in the communities' eyes, increases access to all members of the community, and builds a relationship with all levels of the administrative structure. It reduces distrust between partners, and makes it easier to access communities, since these officials have the best information and contacts available within the community. It also allows some problems to be resolved on the spot, and brings national attention to the communities in a way they do not always see.

Nevertheless, it does restrict community members' willingness to answer questions freely. Additionally, if translation is a consideration, in may result in the translator biasing the answer, or the official "correcting" the answer before translating it. It may also result in the process being sidetracked as the officials try to explain the "right answers" to communities when they answer incorrectly. Ultimately, the research process can be kept somewhat clear by working with the officials beforehand to define expectations and boundaries around how they can behave. However, a researcher should give careful consideration to other ways of getting access to the community and building relationships with officials before having an official present at all of the focus groups.

- **Develop tools for communities that do not yet have canteens:** There are many communities that do not yet have canteens, but that may have canteens in the future, either because the community requested them or because partners are considering placing a canteen there. In order to move toward more community engagement in the design phase of school feeding programmes, it is important to see where communities are and how they resolve problems and communicate with decision makers about programmes. The original research design had not accounted for communities that do not yet have SF, but this is a critical aspect of expanding any programme. Appendix D contains a field-tested diagnostic tool for these kinds of communities.

- **Acknowledge research limitations:** This is a qualitative methodology. These research tools can provide useful insight into communities and the way that the programme functions at all levels, but they are not a randomized control trial methodology, and cannot be generalized to all communities in the programme. Each community has a

unique set of challenges and systems, and while there are some generalizations to draw, the tools are most useful for diagnosing the situation within each community.

For reasons of time and budgetary constraints, the communities in this study are not drawn from a fully representative sample. They serve to indicate broader problems, but a more widely diverse sample of communities could provide a more complete picture. Ideally, a researcher or policy maker working on HGSF would conduct these methodologies in every community where the program was active in order to see both particular and systemic strengths and weaknesses. Failing that, the researcher should pay particular attention to getting a broad range of communities and having a more randomly selected target population in order to have more generalizable results.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT CASE STUDIES

The following case studies use the proposed diagnostic tools to look at the way school feeding programmes in Ghana and Mali have engaged with communities in their activities. In the course of evaluating the state of downward accountability in each programme, they highlight four main areas where these programmes have experienced bottlenecks in community engagement, and could profitably make changes to improve community engagement to increase programme impact:

- Policy Frameworks
- Procurement Systems
- Communications
- Monitoring and Evaluation

The case studies offer recommendations specific to each country and its community engagement systems. The case studies then feed back into improved diagnostic tools and a set of broader recommendations for how to improve community engagement in school feeding programmes more generally.

PART 2: GHANA CASE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

The Ghana School Feeding Program (GSFP) both is and is not a striking success. On the one hand, it has increased enrolment, spread across Ghana to areas urban and rural alike, and improved the physical infrastructure of schools (e.g. kitchens, polytanks, canteens etc.). From 2005 to 2006, the program expanded to 200 schools covering 69,000 pupils across 138 districts. In October 2009, the most recent tally, and GSFP fed 657,000 children across 1,700 schools, which represents more than a fifth of all kindergarten and primary school pupils (Appendix H provides a detailed analysis of GSFP programme objectives and accomplishments to date).[xix]

On the other hand, the program has not lived up to its own expectations. The program aspires to be demand driven; to be owned by and accountable to the community; and to increase local production by opening a market for smallholder farmers. On each count, GSFP falls far short. This research shows that many communities don't know the program exists. For example, parents only receive information about the program from their children and during election campaigns. They are not sensitized to their roles and responsibilities so they do not know what information to demand or how to do so. Similarly, farmers know of the program only if caterers or MoFA extension officers reach out to them. This makes it nearly impossible to hold caterers accountable. When aware of the program, they often did not know how to provide crops to the program.

The recommendations that follow are necessary to ensure that communities are engaged in the design, management and monitoring and evaluation of the GSFP. But given constraints of time and resources, two recommendations deserve particular emphasis and consideration:

- First, the GSFP should ensure that all stakeholders, but especially parents, farmers, and teachers, know their respective roles and responsibilities.

- Second, the GSFP should ensure that the District Implementation Committees and School Implementation Committees are operational and functioning effectively.

Methodology

This case study stems from 1) a review of the literature of the GSFP 2) twenty five extensive interviews from politicians, policymakers, NGO directors and implementers at all levels of operation and 3) eight in-depth focus groups with farmers, parents, caterers and teachers across two different communities, Dodowa and Ga East.

The case study proceeds as follows. First, it provides an overview of community participation in the program. Second, it assesses the systems and processes that inhibit community participation and downward accountability: 1) policy framework, 2) procurement, 2) communications, and 3) monitoring and evaluation. Each of these four sections concludes with recommendations.

OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION

Community Participation in the Ghana School Feeding Program is low. Farmers know of the program only if caterers or MoFA extension officers reach out to them. If they are aware of the program, they often did not know how to become formally involved. Parents only receive information about the program from their children. They are not sensitized to their roles and responsibilities so they do not know what information to demand or how to do so.

Community participation in the GSFP is low at the community level and poorly understood at the national level

There are policymakers and program implementers who think community participation is high. But these individuals tend to define participation as the provision of fuel, firewood, and kitchens for the program. Those who feel there is a problem think it can be improved through passive strategies of communication, sensitization, and strengthening existing institutions.

There is a wide disagreement at the national level over the degree of community involvement In the programme. This disagreement hinges on what community involvement means. The group who considers community involvement to be low—roughly one third of respondents—discusses participation in the terms we outline in our methodology: defining program needs, designing the intervention, managing the daily programming and evaluating success. For example, one policymaker noted, "to the best of my knowledge, they are not involved in the day to day, so there cannot be anything like goal setting." The other group of policymakers thinks of community participation in terms of providing resources and infrastructure. For example, a steering committee member said, "the community of course is highly involved. We are told they make contributions. They provide fuel, firewood, and kitchens. They contact schools through the PTA, DIC and SIC. This is all local level participation."

A third group of policymakers, who also represent one-third of respondents, seem to equate the creation of a School Implementation Committee (SIC) with community participation. One politician, representing this view, remarked, "Since they are represented at SIC and DIC, and these organizations are in charge, community has high influence and ownership of the program." The legitimacy of this last view depends on the legitimacy and effectiveness of the SICs. According to a study by the SEND Foundation, only 6 percent of SICs have met once and only 10 percent of DICs have. Moreover, 14 percent of DICs and 47 percent of SICs were not aware of their terms of reference outlining their expected roles and duties.[xx] Furthermore, according to a study by SNV, major stakeholders are marginalized within these committee structures. For example, they cite instances where the District Directors of Food and Agriculture, and Health were left out of the DIC, while representatives of the PTA, SMC, and school pupils were left out of the decision making process at the school level.[xxi]

Members of the NGO community largely disagreed with national-level policymakers. The former uniformly agreed that communities are not participating in the program in large part

because they were not sensitized to their roles and responsibilities and because the SIC's are not functioning as intended. For example, the director of a NGO serving as a strategic partner to the GSFP said, "if they (SIC members) know the objectives of the GSFP and their own roles, then they can hold who put them there, accountable….SICs might be in place but they don't know their mandate." "They need to be educated about their role," he added. For example, checking the quality of the food is supposed to be a daily routine, but many reported that it's often done only once a month.

Others don't think that awareness and sensitization is enough. "A lot of them [SICs and DICs] don't perform as they should…here in Ghana, one of the problems is that if you want a committee to perform, you need to provide an incentive. If these committees are to be successful, a lot of energy must be put into it. And they aren't compensated for participating." Still others think that sensitization might be enough in rural areas, but not enough in urban areas, where parents are less likely to participate. "People are more individualistic in Accra and they also need less. So they might be less likely to participate. But there is a real sense of community in rural areas and in the North—a social commitment, a community commitment.

Where SICs and DICs exist, politics get in the way. One NGO leader, whose view captures the majority of respondents, said, "Members of the SIC and DIC are hand picked. Their political allegiance is to party or the DCE." Moreover, as noted above, they're not paid, so if a committee is formed, it quickly loses motivation. Further, even when the committees exist and even when they are motivated, there often still exists a gap in communication between the community and the committees. Committees are seen as insular—they talk with one another but do not relay the information to other community members. As a result, the program is not actually decentralized. Decisions are still made in a hierarchical manner—from the top down. A director of a NGO added, "It should be decentralized. But the program is not actually on the ground. There is still gap from the district assembly up to the ministries and down to the community.

The level of participation and awareness varied across communities and stakeholders

There was a great divergence in knowledge and awareness of SICs and DICs. Although there was even variation within groups, the biggest divide seemed to be between teachers and caterers on the one hand, and parents and farmers on the other hand. One of the teachers said that there is a SIC at his school, that they meet once a term, are charged with monitoring the quality and quantity of the food, and take food complaints to the DIC. However, all other teachers either didn't know if a SIC existed or didn't know what an SIC was. In schools without a DIC, teachers uniformly said that they take up concerns about the quality or quantity of the food with the caterer. There were also great differences among the teachers in terms of desired level of involvement. The majority of teachers wanted to be more involved—in the procurement process, in the oversight, even in the serving of the food. But some teachers did not want more participation. One teacher remarked, "it's difficult for a teacher to serve given the nature of our job…even if it takes one extra minute, teachers will not want to do it." The parents knew even less about the SIC. No one had submitted a complaint or concern to the DA, despite the caterer not often providing enough food. And only the PTA chairman, who sits on the SIC, knew it existed. No one else did.

Teachers said that they bring any concerns first to the caterer, and next to the DA, but that communication with the DIC is difficult. They interact with the community largely through PTA meetings, which are held once a term. Teachers admit that they don't know where caterers purchase the food. "They are supposed to buy it from the community, but we don't know if they do." However, to the extent that teachers feel there is local participation, this is because they equated community involvement with local purchasing.

The majority of caterers largely knew of the existence, roles and responsibilities of the SICs and the DICs. "SIC decides on the food. They decide on a menu and we buy based on the menu." The caterers feel as if they are accountable to the DIC, the district coordinator, the national secretariat, and to a lesser extent, the SIC. However, the caterers cite two major challenges:

- First, they are not paid until after they buy and provide the food. This means that they have to get a loan from a local bank. It is often the case that they have not been paid for some time.
- Second, buying local produce is a challenge. The caterers said that while they bought most of their food from local farmers, they "also buy from the local market and traders. We will also buy from other districts if farmers cannot supply a sufficient quantity." This is because "local farmers are cheaper but they do not produce enough." For some caterers, quantity is not always the problem the purchase of goods from local farmers. "Farmers are not willing to sell cheaper than the open-market price."

In stark contrast, no farmers and only a few parents were aware of the program. Most parents did not know if they had a SIC or a DIC. Nevertheless, they received a lot of information from their children and the daily menu. One parent remarked, "Because of the menu I change what I give my daughter because she doesn't like beans…we depend on our children for information about the program." The vast majority of parents maintained, "we have not been invited to participate. If given the opportunity, we would like to participate in the program more." However, participation is difficult; most parents admitted, "We would not know where to go if we wanted to make a contribution or contact a decision maker." They added, "Sometimes we go to the head teacher to learn about the quality of the food, but it's not easy to contact the DA. Even if we complain, it takes so much time to get a response from the head teacher." They went on to say that they would like the opportunity to monitor the program—to visit the school on occasion to see what type of food is served, how it is prepared, and to test the quality of the food.

The farmers varied considerably in their reply. In one community, the farmers did not know that the programme existed, and had never supplied food to it. In another community, two farmers had never supplied food to the program, and had not heard of the program. One farmer supplied once, another farmer had supplied twice, and a third farmer had supplied three times to the school-feeding program. Those farmers that had sold to the program cited the low price caterers offer and major delays in payment—sometimes 4-6 weeks after delivering the food—as reasons why they only supplied a few times. Nevertheless, all of the farmers unanimously and eagerly said that they wanted to participate in the program. "We want to be involved. We want to sell to

the program. But we need to be paid on time and at a good price." They also cited a lack of information about the program. "It's not easy to learn about the program. We get information through the ministry of agric extension officer. It's supposed to be through the caterer, I think, but they do not come."

POLICY FRAMEWORK

The GSFP, on paper, is decentralized. It's meant to transfer political power, responsibility and resources from the central government to the people. It's meant to increase civic participation and engender accountability. Ghana instituted a policy of decentralization in 1998 with the passage of PNDC Law 207, which created a number of District Assemblies, or local government administrations. This system intended, in other words, for local people to work with their representatives to outline the problems faced by their community and determine together how to solve them. In developing social accountability systems specific to Ghana, it's critical to understand this system, its component parts, and the roles and responsibilities of each institution and committee. The following section outlines how this institutional arrangement is supposed to work and how it actually works.

National Level

The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development has oversight of the GSFP, which is meant to coordinate and manage the program. It is expected to support the district level committees and ensure accountability and reporting of the program. At the national level, technical officers from the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, and the Ministry of Women and Children Affairs design the policy, while the District Assemblies and sub committees implement the policy.[xxii] A number of NGOs and civil society organizations, including the World Food Programme (WFP), Netherlands Development Cooperation (SNV), Social Enterprise Development Organization (SEND), United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Agro-Eco, and EKN serve as strategic partners. Appendix I outlines the initial roles

and responsibilities of the GSFP National Secretariat, as articulated in the District Operations Manual.[xxiii]

Figure 3: GSFP Organizational Structure



This arrangement does not function well in practice. Coordination is poor at the national level and disagreements exist over the roles and responsibilities of policymakers. While there was a wide range of views expressed regarding the coordination of national-level policymakers, the consensus opinion is best summed up by a member of the GSFP, "Across the ministries, everyone is doing their own thing. They are not coordinating well." It was largely agreed, however, that the Ministry of Education and Ministry of Local Government and Rural

Development are more active and more effective in their role, while the Ministry of Food and Agriculture is still largely uninvolved.

A recent effort to meet following a poor evaluation of the program displays this lack of coordination. "We were supposed to meet in October to review the system. But we haven't. A number of the incumbent ministers have been moved out, so it's impossible to coordinate," he said. Indeed, it is difficult to coordinate in part because the program is inherently political—national and regional coordinators of the GSFP change with each election. This perception that the program is political is problematic at the community level as well. Thinking of it as a government program can undercut community ownership of the program. According to one participant, whose view captures the consensus opinion of the NGO community, "the program was introduced as political, as a project the government would provide, so the community didn't feel the need to participate."

There is also disagreement over the roles and responsibilities of policymakers at the national level. Some see understanding issues of implementation as critical to effectively doing their job and as a result, seek out information from the DA. The majority, however, see their role simply advising on matters of policy, and nothing more. This view is captured by one of the participants: "The coordinators (GSFP) should tell us about best practices and implementation. They should know what is working and what is not working, so we can import best practices to other communities…At this level we don't need more coordination. We have our own jobs to do…We do the policies and submit it to be implemented. This is how it should operate." This view is detrimental because it privileges one-way communication and undermines the importance of constant feedback and revaluation.[3]

[3] There is also a significant difference in levels of awareness about the program, what's meant by local food, and who should implement the program. For example, while most participants knew of and could recite some of the specific guidelines of the program, others didn't know whether guidelines existed. Moreover, while some considered

The coordination is poor in part because the GSFP National Secretariat is spread thin.

For example, one participant said "the GSFP National Secretariat is over-stretched. You cannot have a team of ten trying to run a $40 million project and be responsible for the design, coordination and monitoring. It's not possible."

District and Community Level

The District Assembly, or the local government administration, is charged with implementing GSFP. Appendix I outlines the roles and responsibilities of the District Assembly, as articulated in the District Operations Manual.[xxiv]

The District Desk Officer (DDO) is appointed by the District Assembly and serves as the DA liaison to the District Implementation Committee (DIC), School Implementation Committee (SIC) and GSFP. The DIC is composed of the District Chief Executive, (Chairman), the District Directors of Education, Health and Agriculture, one traditional ruler from the District, one opinion leader form the district, two representatives of the social-services sub-committee, and the District Desk Officer. Appendix I outlines the roles and responsibilities of the DIC as indicated in the District Operations Manual.[xxv]

The SIC is meant to oversee all school feeding activities. It is composed of the PTA Representative of the beneficiary school (Chairperson), head teacher of the school (Secretary),

---

'local food' to mean it was produced in the community, others considered 'local food' to be food produced within the country. Last, while some thought the program should be managed and implemented by the community and schools, the majority thought it should be managed and implemented by the district.

one representative of the School Management Committee, one traditional ruler from the community, an assembly member, and the boys and girls prefects of the school. Appendix I outlines the roles and responsibilities of the SIC as indicated by the District Operations Manual.[xxvi]

As noted above, this arrangement does not function effectively in practice. A recent SNV study says that "at present, the DICs and SICs are only structural symbols and do not know their roles and responsibilities."[xxvii] Indeed, both are new concepts without a legal mandate. Members are not paid, which has minimized participation where the committees exist. The introduction of these committees prompted confusion and at times conflict with similar, already existing institutions, like the School Management Committee, now bypassed by the SIC.

DICs are set up first and tasked with forming SICs, according to the roles and responsibilities outlined above. So if DICs exist, so too should SICs. But while 34 of the 36 districts have DICs, there is considerable variation at the school level: 88% of schools in the Upper East region have SICs, as do 55% of the schools in the Northern region, 58% in the Western region, 42% in the Volta region and 27% in the Central region.[xxviii]

Recommendations for Policy Framework

Recommendation 1: Sensitize policymakers and community members alike to their roles and responsibilities. The Ministry of Local Government together with SNV has a sensitization program at the community level to ensure that everyone knows what is expected of them and what they should expect themselves. This should be done at the district and national level as well, as policymakers across different ministries and levels of government conceive of their roles and responsibilities differently.

Recommendation 2: Motivate SIC and DIC membership. It takes time and effort to be an effective participant of a SIC or DIC. The participants should be compensated either by providing refreshments at meetings or a quarterly stipend to encourage their participation.

Recommendation 3: De-politicize the program. For example, if the GSFP were classified as a civil service organization and staffed by fewer political appointees they would experience less staff turnover and be seen as objective actors.

PROCUREMENT PROCESS

The caterer is charged with procuring and cooking food at a large scale (either for one school or a cluster of schools depending on the size and makeup of the community). Appendix I outlines the caterer's roles and responsibilities as indicated by the District Operations Manual. Appendix J outlines how and why the procurement process has evolved since the beginning of the program.

Getting the procurement process right is critical for downward accountability and community ownership. For example, if caterers are hired in a transparent way and the school is aware of their roles and responsibilities, teachers and parents can hold them accountable. Or if the caterer makes the menu public and allows for community participation, parents can shape the kind of food their children eat. But the procurement process, as is, doesn't work as it is supposed to. Knowledge of the procurement system varies considerably at the national level. Most but not all policymakers know how the process is supposed to work—the DA pays the caterer to buy foodstuffs from local sources, hire cooks from the local community and prepare the food under hygienic and sanitary conditions. But a number of participants didn't know if it mattered that caterers buy from local farmers, from the market directly, or from outside the community. One policymaker admitted, "I don't know the procurement process. The school-feeding program is supposed to use local farmers, I think, but how it's bought and provided, I don't know. It's possible the program gives cooks money to buy the food, but I don't know."

Caterers don't buy from smallholder farmers

According to national policymakers however, caterers don't buy from local farmers. One participant noted, "80 percent of foodstuffs are supposed to be purchased locally. But caterers

are still purchasing outside the local market or from foreign producers. The DICs and the SICs are supposed to hold the caterers accountable but they often don't." Caterers are buying outside the local community in part because there isn't a clear definition of what 'local' means. When prompted, participants varied widely in their definition of local—from within the community, to the district, the region, and within Ghana.

Caterers often don't buy from smallholders because they have an incentive to buy from the cheapest sources. One policymaker said, "the caterer goes to the market and buys the cheapest bundle. Small farmers tend to be more expensive, especially when buying in bulk." Another policymaker added, "You're dealing with people (caterers) who are profit oriented. So he will want to get food at the lowest cost, so they will buy imported foods like rice at low costs." This view is shared among the NGO community. One director of a local NGO argued, "caterers go for the cheapest food. They (the farmers) know of the program. But caterers don't buy from them…You need market linkages like demonstration farms, farmer field schools, even sampling of the food by the children."

In the focus groups, caterers said they buy most of their food from local farmers, but that they also have to buy from private traders because farmers cannot provide enough food. "It's not a sufficient quantity. We will also buy from other districts and the market if farmers cannot provide sufficient quantity. Local farmers are cheaper but they don't produce enough."

Linking the farmers to the program also depends partly on trust. One NGO leader emphasized the fears farmers often express: "they worry that they won't be paid on time, when the prices increase, will farmers get the current price? Farmers cannot wait to be paid but they're told to come back. If money comes promptly, it engenders trust. But the farmers don't trust the government. DAs have promised so many things to farmers in the past and have failed. And because of past experience they don't trust the local government." The issue of trust, however, seems to matter less than one might think, as farmers are still eager to participate. In survey after survey, nearly 100 percent of farmers say they want to provide food for the program. For example, in one community, when farmers heard the caterer was buying kenke every Tuesday, they went looking for maize and started to produce maize. They increased their production so they could supply for GSFP.

In the focus groups, the farmers' experiences varied considerably. Two farmers had never supplied food to the program, and had not heard of the program. One farmer supplied once,

another farmer had supplied twice, and a third farmer had supplied three times to the school-feeding program. Those farmers that had sold to the program cited three reasons why they only sold a few times:

- First, they say, caterers want too cheap of a price. "Our product is of high quality but they want it sold at a very cheap price. They want cheaper goods."
- Second, farmers aren't paid on time. "When they took my produce, it was a long time before they came to pay. Maybe 4-6 weeks." This is especially problematic because farmers self-finance—they can't obtain a loan from a local bank in order to smooth their consumption during that time period. "The first time I was paid promptly. But I told them that I will not sell when they don't have cash because I finance everything myself. I could not get a loan."
- Third, there is a lack of information about the program. "It's not easy to learn about the program. We get information through the ministry of agric extension officer. It's supposed to be through the caterer, I think, but they do not come."

All of the farmers unanimously and eagerly said that they wanted to participate in the program. "We want to be involved. We want to sell to the program. But we need to be paid on time and at a good price."

It is important to note that 100 percent participation of smallholder farmers from the start might not make practical sense. A number of participants worried that farmers could provide sufficient quantity for the program. "You cannot link farmers from the beginning because buying from small farmers creates issues of quality and quantity. And the response to demand is slow." One actor saw the proposed buffer stock as a logical transition strategy. The government is beginning to create a buffer stock where they would buy from the farmers at a predictable price. They would then store and preserve that food in a silo from which the caterers would buy. It will take time and money, however, for the buffer stock to decentralize to all communities across Ghana. In the mean time, a number of participants suggested striking relationships with NGOs serve as an intermediary between the farmer and the caterer.

Hiring caterers is a political, non-transparent process that limits community oversight

According to the national level policymakers, two additional problems exist with the procurement system. First, caterers aren't paid on time. They are paid after they provide the food, meaning they have to buy the food on credit. As a result, the food costs more because they have to pay interest on the loan, they cannot pay the suppliers of foodstuffs on time (which makes it difficult to buy from small farmers who self-finance), and they cannot pay the cooks on time. Second, procurement process is political. Caterers are not hired based on objective criteria. They are hired, according to the majority of policymakers, based on their political party affiliation and their relationship with the DCE. One participant argued, "the process needs to be devoid of politics. When the new government was elected a few years ago, all the caterers were sacked. They hired all new caterers."

Furthermore, the NGO/CSO community sees the procurement process as inherently political. One participant remarked, "caterers are presumed to serve as political supporters." Another participant added, "One of the problems with procurement is that is politicized. It's important that rules be clear, well followed, so that a friend of a friend of the DCE isn't given a contract. This was shown in the PriceWaterhouseCoopers audit."

There is little oversight of the caterer

The politicization of the procurement process begins with the contract process. "Directors of education don't go through the contract process so they have no idea what's in the contract. This influences the competence of the caterers, which influences the efficacy of the process and the quality of the food. The selection of caterers should be transparent…if it's transparent, people can question the caterer. As it stands, the TOR is not made public." This is important for purposes of demand-side accountability as it provides community members the information necessary to hold caterers accountable. For example, one participant cited that in his community, the school was asked to provide resources like firewood to cook the food, but the caterer was providing cooked food. In another community, a participant said that a caterer hired someone who took the raw food away. But in both of these instances, the community did not

know what they could do to hold the caterer accountable because they didn't know their roles and responsibilities nor did they know the contract signed by the caterer.

The majority of teachers knew that caterers provide the food but didn't know if the food was purchased locally. They knew that it was their responsibility to provide oversight of the quality of the food, but did not know exactly who they should go to if the food was of low quality. Teachers often went to the caterers and not to the district assembly. One parent, the PTA chairman, knew how the food was provided, but others did not. And the parents did not know who to turn to, other than the teachers, when their children reported that the food was of low quality or insufficient quantity.

In Dodowa, the caterers said that the SIC committee decides on the food. "They decide on the menu and we buy based on the menu. And we hire people from the community to cook the food." They went on to say that "we haven't had any complaints because we serve the teachers as well." This goes against the guidelines set out in the operations manual. Furthermore, while the caterers asserted that participating in the program had "earned us respect," they said that one of their principal problems was being paid on time: "sometimes the whole term will go by and no money comes from it. The payments are delayed. I cooked for 61 days without being paid and we need to pay the workers but we can't." Another caterer said, "We have to pre-finance. Sometimes we aren't paid for 30 days to three months. That's the problem, so we have to go to local banks for a loan. And then we end up paying a higher amount because of the interest."

Recommendations for Procurement Process

In short, the hiring process is political, which limits community oversight. Caterers don't often buy from smallholder farmers, which limits their participation and makes the program supply rather than demand driven. And there is very little oversight of the caterers and whether they provide the right food on time. Given these findings, we recommend that:

Recommendation 1: The criteria for hiring caterers should be objective, publicly available, and sent to school administrators and teachers. Hiring should be done through a participatory process that includes a number of district level actors in addition to the DCE.

Recommendation 2: There should support a clear definition of what 'local' means that balances existing constraints with program goals.

Recommendation 3: Parents should provide oversight of the food preparation in communities where caterers cook offsite.

COMMUNICATIONS

Gaps in communication exist throughout the GSFP. This diminishes accountability to beneficiaries and transparency to all stakeholders. Communication flows from the ground up, according to most participants. If a problem exists, students will bring it to the attention of their teacher, who will either solve the problem, engage the caterer to solve the problem or if necessary, take the problem to the SIC. If the problem cannot be solved by the caterer or the SIC, they pass it along to the DIC. If the DIC cannot handle the problem, it is passed up to the regional desk officer and if necessary, the GSFP and responsible ministry.

The flow of information depends on ineffective institutions

Participants varied considerably in their views of the effectiveness of this flow of information. Some think that it's not at all effective—that it's a slow, bureaucratic process that depends on defunct institutions. One participant remarked, "This is a bureaucratic process. Response happens very slowly. I remember one time, caterers were upset that they needed more funds

because of high food prices. But we didn't hear of this complaint for quite some time, and then trying to get more funds allocated was difficult because it had to be approved by the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning."

This finding—that national level policymakers hear about problems long after the problem occurs—seems to be a pattern. Most participants at the national level said they heard of problems with the program mostly through the media. On the one hand, that the media serves as a mechanism of oversight and accountability should be celebrated. On the other hand, this suggests a gap or perhaps a number of gaps in the flow of information from the community to the GSFP National Secretariat and various ministries.

If a problem or policy change arises at the national level, the first step is to contact the DIC. The DIC is then supposed to solve the problem or implement the policy change by reaching out to the SIC, but this process is rife with complications. First, many SICs and DICs are not set up or not functional. All participants argued that communication depended on the efficacy of the SICs and DICs. "Communication is supposed to be structured all the way throughout the program. The SICs and DICs are supposed to be the link between various levels. But they're not working as they're supposed to." As a result, program awareness and effective communications relies on chiefs and opinion leaders. One participant remarked, "right now, communication depends on the chiefs and opinion leaders in the community. If they are active in the program and aware of their responsibilities, they will be community champions."

Moreover, according to a number of participants, "there are no proper implementation guidelines or even if they exist there is no strict adherence to them and also no one sees to it that they are adhered to." In other words, even if information flows as designed, it's not guaranteed that the problem will be solved or concern ameliorated, as committees are either not functional, unaware

of their roles and responsibilities, or unchecked. Moreover, ministries only share information through quarterly meetings of the steering committee.

Communication with farmers and parents is low

Teachers communicate with caterers when they need to voice a concern. Sometimes they reach out to the desk officer for education in the district assembly, though this is less common. Parents communicate through teachers, and to a lesser extent, caterers. One group of parents said, "we do often contact them, the caterers. We contact the teachers too. If we have any problems, we contact the caterer. But we don't have a direct link to the District assembly." Another group of parents, however, said that they don't know who to reach out to or how to do so.

Many farmers and parents still don't understand the concept of home grown school feeding let alone their roles and responsibilities within the program. One participant said, "We need to sensitize the farmers and the community members. All the stakeholders need to know their roles and responsibilities. When actors know their roles, they can make demands." This was reaffirmed in interviews with farmers. Time and time again, farmers said that they wanted to participate in the program, but either didn't know about it or didn't know how to get involved. One farmer said, "It's not easy to get information on the program. Sometimes we hear about it from the Ministry of Agriculture extension officers. We want to be involved. We want to sell to the program….but there is a lack of information about the program."

There is a disagreement at the national level as to the importance of continued sensitization. Some considered it critical. "There needs to be more emphasis on the role of the community," a member of the GSFP National Secretariat said. He went on, "Awareness and sensitization is important to community participation. Awareness and sensitization will do everything. When they have knowledge of the program, they will effectively participate." A different member of the GSFP National Secretariat, however, saw the problem differently. "Initially, the problem

seemed to be a lack of awareness. But now the information is getting better and people know what's expected of them…now the problem is capacity building and funding."

Recommendations for Communications

In short, the flow of information depends on defunct institutions and limits the participation of a few key stakeholders, including farmers and parents. In other words, communication is supply driven. To move toward demand driven communications and downward accountability, we recommend that:

Recommendation 1: The GSFP should support putting a representative of a farmer-based organization on SICs.

Recommendation 2: GSFP should think about how to use mobile phones to expedite the complaint process and allow community members to directly contact the DA. For example, teachers could text 1 if the food was of sufficient quality and quantity and 0 if it wasn't. The text message could be sent to a desk officer at the DA to track and aggregate over time.

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The GSFP is working to develop a monitoring and evaluation tool. As a result, most efforts at M&E have been undertaken by NGOs in an uncoordinated, rather haphazard fashion. The DA is supposed to submit quarterly reports to the GSFP on the progress of the program, but they're not often completed and the reports don't follow a set of standards of guidelines from which one could compare the results across different districts.

These reports are supposed to be cross checked with the school level 'Funds Retirement Form,' which is supposed to be a daily account of the amount of students fed as well as any comments on the quality or quantity of the food. It includes the name of the caterer, school, head teacher, and SIC member. The SIC member and head teacher are supposed to verify the number of students fed and submit it to the desk officer and regional coordinator for their signature. This process is supposed to happen everyday, but participants at the district and school level admitted that these sheets are filled out once a week or once a month

Policymakers differ considerably in their knowledge and opinion of M&E within the GSFP. The minority of participants think that M&E is working as it should—that it involves the community, happens regularly, and includes participation from all sectors involved, and that it informs policy changes. The vast majority of participants didn't know if GSFP had any M&E mechanisms in place. One participant said, "we need guidelines for M&E to have uniformity so we're all looking at the same metrics. But I'm not sure if we have M&E at the local level, you should ask them."

The majority of participants talked less about M&E and more about mechanisms for ensuring that M&E happens, as if one leads to the other. One participant said, "Our first call is to the district. They get the desk officer to do the monitoring, who then provides feedback. They don't involve the PTA or many community members. It's difficult to get them together and many of them don't know about GSFP." Others emphasized the need to develop standards of measurement. One participant said, "it should be done at the regional and district level. But we need to develop universal standards across all levels so that we're measuring the same thing. Currently this isn't the case." Another participant added, "monitoring and evaluation should be collaborative. It should be based on a standard monitoring checklist so that we look at the same things."

Other participants emphasized the role of the media in monitoring and evaluation. Often concerns regarding the program are brought to the attention of national level policymakers by the media. "We want the media to play a role. But they need to highlight the good parts of the implementation too. They need to help us speak at the local level." Others thought the SIC and SMC institutions monitor and evaluate the program, and didn't see the need for an additional institution or set of guidelines. "Yes, we already have SMC institutions for monitoring and evaluation at the local level," one participant said.

Participants from the NGO community cited a few principal problems with M&E. First, the school-feeding program is evaluated but not monitored. "We do evaluation but we don't do monitoring in Ghana. We wait until the end of the project to see if it's meeting its aims. We don't have the opportunity to correct along the way. We need monthly monitoring to issue constant improvements and changes because we don't know what happens in between." This, in theory, is supposed to be the role of the SIC but for reasons discussed above, the SICs are largely ineffective. Second, M&E doesn't involve the community. Many saw involving the community as critical to the sustainability of the program but admitted that the community is largely uninvolved in the process. One participant remarked, "they are they beneficiary. It's about the demand side. For sustainability purposes, it's important that the feedback come from the communities. That's why communities need to know about the program."

The communities want to be involved in the monitoring and evaluation but don't necessarily know how. "It should involve all groups; parents, teachers, head teachers, kids. Yes we would like to participate in the monitoring of the program. It will hold caterers to account. They will know they have to do right things if we are there monitoring."

Recommendations for Monitoring & Evaluation

In short, community members are not involved in the monitoring and evaluation process despite a desire on behalf of parents to provide oversight. To tap into this demand, we recommend that:

Recommendation 1: The government should provide a platform for parents to participate in the monitoring of the food preparation on a day-to-day basis.

Recommendation 2: Monitoring and evaluation should be participatory and involve collaborating ministries at the district level.

Recommendation 3: The capacity of local actors, specifically parents, should be built to the point that they can provide M&E support.

PART 3: MALI CASE STUDY

INTRODUCTION

Community participation in Mali has mixed results, depending on which phase of the process. It is limited at the defining needs and designing interventions stages of the programme, which happen largely at the national level. Each of the three main partners has its own needs definition and programme design process, and few of the communities are involved in this process in a serious way. Communities rarely hear back from anyone higher than the district level, or implementers may address community concerns by saying that planning is done on a three- to five-year basis, and that their needs cannot be met until the new planning cycle. The monitoring and evaluation phase shows similar weaknesses of top-down decision-making. Communities are active in the evaluation stage, but have no mechanism for receiving information or feedback from the national partners.

Through the School Management Committees (CGS), participation is fairly robust in day-to-day programme management. Almost all of the communities display serious commitment to the canteen through contributions of vegetables, food, water, fuel, and labour. There is an awareness of the benefits of school feeding, and a willingness to work to meet these goals. Communities even pitch in to cover the gap when national level partners are late delivering food, or deliver too little, an occurrence that happens a few times a year in most places. Additionally, there are strong ties between local and district levels, and communities feel comfortable going to their school director or district canteen technician with problems they have.

While all of the recommendations in the case study would improve community engagement, it may not be possible to implement them all at once. In the case of resource or capacity

constraints, the implementers should first focus on two critical steps for improving downward accountability and community engagement:

1) **Improve coordination between implementing partners** at the national level so they can coordinate and standardize their selection and procurement processes. This will facilitate the implementation of the second recommendation;
2) **Build and utilize better vertical communications systems** between the national, district, and community levels in order to discover problems and be able to act on them quickly. This will allow communities to take more ownership of their programmes and be better able to run them sustainably. Having a unified set of selection and procurement systems will greatly improve the ability to communicate with local actors and act on community concerns.

Methodology

The information for this case study comes from three main sources: 1) Reviewing policy and programme documents from the three main actors in school feeding in Mali; 2) Interviewing national- and district-level implementing partners from all partners to see their perspectives on the programme, and 3) Interviewing focus groups in twenty communities spread across two regions and seven districts in Mali. See Appendix F for a list of the interviews conducted and communities visited.

For security reasons, there were no focus groups conducted in the Northern regions of Mali—Gao, Timbuktu, Northern Koulikoro, and Kidal. This does limit the universality of the study, since the methodologies and political realities of school feeding, as well as the lifestyle of the communities in the North are different than in the southern part of Mali. The North may require different strategies for community engagement that this study cannot speak to, and that area merits further study. However, the methodology for research and tools used in this case study should be applicable to the North, and Malian partners should be able to conduct a diagnosis of community engagement using them.

This case study gives a brief overview of the players and institutional structure in school feeding programmes in Mali. These actors and their interactions are crucial because the configuration has important implications for each of the major problem areas that this research uncovered as common in HGSF community engagement structures, not just in Mali, but more generally: 1) Policy Frameworks, 2) Procurement Processes, 3) Communications, 4) Monitoring and Evaluation.

The report then highlights each of the areas in the Malian context to illuminate how the institutional structure and community engagement interact. It gives examples of each problem specific to Mali, and recommendations for how to think about addressing the problem.

INSTITUTIONAL OVERVIEW

Currently, the Government of Mali (GOM), the World Food Programme (WFP), and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) are the three main sources of funding and support for canteens. Each of these actors has its own selection criteria, procurement processes, communications systems, and operational frameworks.

Figure 4: Distribution of Canteens



Together, the actors cover 1520 schools in Mali, which amounts to 26% of schools in food insecure zones and 15% of schools overall. However, while relations between these actors are cordial, and there is a monthly national coordination meeting between the partners, the actors continue to operate largely independently from each other. One exception to this is that the partners coordinate enough to avoid operating canteens in the same schools.

Figure 5 shows the current structure in the policy framework that manages school feeding programs. The national coordinator works with roughly seventy district-level school canteen coordinators (CC), who work for the local Centres for Pedagogic Learning (CAP), which serve as the district-level representation of the Ministry of Education. The district level technicians answer to the Teaching Academy (AE), which is the regional-level body of the Ministry of Education. The AEs typically have someone who works with the canteens, but it generally as part of a portfolio, rather than an individual's entire job. The current coordinator prefers to go directly to the CAP level and work with individuals there because they have a better sense of the realities in the field and are better able to give him information. He finds the regional level to be more removed and less helpful. The CC at each CAP works with the school management committees (CGS), which every community has.

Figure 5: Mali School Feeding Organizational Structure



Each school has a local School-Based Management Committee (CGS), which functions to incorporate local concerns into school programming. This is the structure that would naturally adopt ownership of school feeding programming at the local level, and work to coordinate local actors such as cooks, farmers, parents, purchasers, etc. These management structures exhibit both the most community engagement and the most community satisfaction. All twenty communities in the study expressed satisfaction with the CGS model because it allowed them to engage in the daily management of the school and canteen. Each community also wished that the CGS had more control over the procurement of food, since this would allow money to stay in the community and allow the communities to better control the quality of food.

Currently, all of the main actors who implement school canteens work with the CGS to some extent. Many times the partner will have given some training to the CGS to explain what their roles and responsibilities are in managing a school canteen.

The CGS are made up of parents, teachers, the school director, a representative of the chief, and representatives from women's associations. The CGSs differ in their composition, but typically they either create a school canteen subcommittee or assign a few members to monitor the canteen and its activities. These members generally include a stock manager, a representative of the women who cook, and a treasurer. In many communities the school director also helps with this process, as he or she may be one of the few literate adults in the community. As yet, there are no CGS which explicitly have representatives of the agricultural community as members, unless parents or other CGS members happen to be part of the local agricultural associations. As many parents are farmers, this is not uncommon, but there is no specific representative to speak for the concerns of farmers who might be selling to the canteens.

POLICY FRAMEWORKS

In November 2009 the GOM passed a national school feeding policy with the goal of improving school feeding in Mali. WFP in particular was instrumental in helping the government formulate the national policy and organize its adoption by the Cabinet. This policy carefully selects target criteria and lays out a comprehensive legal framework for school feeding. It also creates a National Directorate for School Feeding (DCNS), which aims to:

- Create an orienting framework harmonizes all school feeding interventions and approaches;
- Contribute to the achievement of MDGs;
- Contribute to local development in the host community.

The DCNS also aims to build government capacity to coordinate school feeding efforts and provide services, namely:

- Provide support to and answer questions from local governments in order to plan school feeding systems that conform to the national policy;
- Propose and implement activities to promote pilot canteens;
- Ensure coordination, implementation, and monitoring of school feeding strategies, and;
- Design and reinforce legislative and regulatory measures on school feeding.

The eventual aim of the GOM is to harmonize all of the different approaches, and bring all activities under the umbrella of the DNCS. However, as of January 2011, the Cabinet of Ministers had not signed off on creating the DCNS. This means that a single national school feeding coordinator operates all GOM school feeding activities currently under the National Directorate for Basic Education (DNEB).

The policy framework leads to—and Figure 5 highlights—two main roadblocks to community engagement built into the institutional structure: silos and the lack of agricultural ties.

Challenges

First, the actors operate very much in silos, with few formal ties between the organizations at any level. In any given district there are informal ties if the actors happen to have good relationships, but there are not formal, institutionalized, ties.. The National School Feeding Coordinator hosts a monthly coordination meeting with implementing partners, including WFP, CRS, and other NGOs, but this is not required, and serves mainly for the organizations to keep each other informed of their activities. The largest problem this has in terms of community engagement is that the lack of formal connection means that the partners have different selection criteria and selection processes to create a canteen. This has significantly hampered community engagement at the defining needs and designing interventions phases of programming.

Each community in the study felt that the appropriate way to request a canteen or express a need was to go through the district level CC, even though those actors only influence selection in the government processes. Ultimately, the separation at the national level means that communities have great difficulty engaging in the defining needs and designing interventions phases of programming, because they do not know which actors to address or how to tailor a request for a

canteen to that actor's requirements. Certainly the communities have not participated in laying out what criteria the different partners use to define needs. Such processes as exist to engage the community are almost exclusively passive. Communities with WFP and CRS canteens typically describe the selection process as an extension agents coming to their communities to explain what a canteen was and what the community role in the process would be. The agent then asked them to sign a request form for a canteen if they were willing to take on these responsibilities.

Second, there are no official ties to the Ministry of Agriculture and its staff at any programme level to institute a Home Grown model. Again, there are informal structures in place. The National Coordinator from the Ministry of Agriculture does attend the monthly coordination meetings, because he personally is interested in and collaborates well on the issue of school feeding. The fact that no Ministry of Health representative chooses to attend these meetings despite being invited underscores that existing coordination and collaboration is tenuous. Additionally, there are no formal ties between agricultural programming in the field and the school feeding programmes. While nearly half of the communities with canteens said that they would prefer to purchase locally and had already organized a community field to help provide staple goods for the programme, there is no agricultural support available to them to increase yields and make community fields a feasible way of supplying the canteens. It might be possible for communities to get agricultural support form the MoA or another partner, but they would have to complete an entirely separate request procedure. As it stands, communities are not receiving the combined benefits of HGSF that tying MoA structures into the process at all levels would allow.

Recommendations

Improve coordination between partners: The fact of having three major partners and a handful of smaller actors supporting canteens makes it very difficult to coordinate efforts on both operational and M&E levels. It also creates obstacles to community participation in the defining needs and designing interventions phases of the programmes. Efforts to improve coordination should include:

- Partners working together to harmonize their selection criteria and operational procedures;
- WFP and CRS representation in or ties to the DNCS;
- Requiring genuine request procedures from the community;
- Examining community educational, agricultural, and nutritional needs, and allowing communities to voice those needs;
- Having a functional and fully-staffed DNCS to help alleviate many of the coordination and bottleneck difficulties; and
- Expanding financial and capacity-building support to the district level government implementers (mostly the CCs).

The fastest and clearest way to improve coordination between the various partners is to fully implement the existing policy framework, and allow the DNCS to fulfil its role as a harmonizing body. The framework as it exists actually responds to many of the concerns, but it is not yet enforced. As WFP and CRS were involved in the elaboration and validation of this policy and the conference to adopt it, they might be willing to think about using the frameworks that the policy sets up to guide their own selection procedures.

Strengthen ties to agriculture at all levels of intervention: Coupling agriculture and school feeding programming is essential for creating successful and sustainable HGSF. There are several possibilities to fill this recommendation. Some of these are:

- Including representatives from the MoA in the DNCS;
- Building ties between CCs and MoA and NGO agricultural extension agents;
- Including agricultural criteria such as potential yield growth into the selection process for canteens;
- Tying school feeding criteria—primarily enrolment, educational attainment, distance to schools, and nutrition—into the selection criteria for the MoA's agricultural interventions;
- Building agricultural programming into school feeding interventions, so that educating and supporting farmers is an automatic part of programming; and
- Adding one or more representatives of local farmers' organizations as a member of the CGS.

Procurement Process

The procurement processes themselves not only reflect a lack of community engagement in the design phase, but also actively prevent engagement in the management phase. Each of the main partners has different procurement processes, but they revolve largely around the central level providing shipments of staple goods to the CGS. Typically, the partners provide the main staples to the canteen—rice, millet, and cooking oil—and the community provides any other ingredients or necessary materials—such as water, vegetables, and firewood. In many cases, rice and millet come from within Mali, and the Vitamin A enriched soybean oil and peas are generally Canadian or American in origin. In some cases, WFP and CRS also provide US or Canadian corn-soy blend as a staple for canteens. Mali does produce beans and cowpeas, and so it might be possible to replace the peas with local products, but there is not enough oil production locally to sustain SF programmes.

The procurement processes move food from a central level, usually in the food-secure areas of southern Mali, out to the villages on a quarterly or semi-annual basis. Most actors and communities cited difficulties with the central procurement model: accounting for preferences, late deliveries, inflexible quantities, difficult quality control, and lack of money in the local economy. Citing these problems reveals an awareness of and a preference for HGSF.

The five main problems communities cited were that:

- Central control does not allow for their local food habits and preferences: Two villages—one that works with the GOM and one that works with WFP—cited that they eat primarily rice, but that the partner is providing millet, which makes the students sick and the have a hard time eating it. Every other community said that they would prefer local procurement because they could buy the kinds of food they have and eat.

- Food deliveries are often late, and communities have no way to control or resolve this problem: At the time of the field research, all six of the communities with WFP canteens had gone for at least a month without food from WFP because the deliveries were late. All of the canteens were still in operation because the communities had stepped in and donated food to fill the gap, but they had no knowledge of when food was supposed to arrive, how to get in touch with someone to find out the status of the delivery, or how much there would be. Communities are willing and able to sustain the programmes for a few days at a time, but not indefinitely. Most communities said they would stop after a month or two.

- Communities do not know the vendors, and so cannot control for quality: All eight canteens that did not have a local purchase model cited the poor quality of food, and one village even displayed the seven kilograms of dirt that they had sifted out of a fifty kilogram sack of millet. Because food is delivered infrequently from the central level, the communities have no way of refusing delivery for this food or sanctioning the seller. All twenty communities stated that if they purchased locally, they would be able to control quality because they knew the sellers, who would be embarrassed to sell low quality grain for their community's children.

- Central procurement means centrally controlled enrolment estimates, and not enough food: All six WFP communities stated that the procurement did not bring enough rations for all of the students at the school. According to the communities, as school enrolment rises due to the canteen—which is one of the canteens primary goals—WFP does not change the amount of food it sends, so each community had spent some time without staples from WFP to cover the students present. Some communities said they had tried to engage with WFP on this issue and were told that programming and enrolment numbers are set in three- to five-year programming plans that cannot be adjusted.

- Local farmers do not benefit from the money for school feeding: Many of the communities said that if they purchased food locally they could benefit local farmers and save money on food and transport prices. This shows a clear awareness of the benefits of HGSF on which implementers could capitalize.

The problems also reveal a lack of community engagement in the designing interventions phase of project programming, and to some extent the daily management phase. If communities had been actively involved in the design, they would have expressed these concerns to decision-makers. Similarly, if they controlled purchases locally, they would be more engaged in daily management of timely and quality food purchases.

There is another challenge in the central purchase model that seems to be unique to the GOM programme. In the first year, the food central suppliers received money as a payment to deliver staples to the schools. In many cases—and in all of the state-run canteens that this project interviewed—those suppliers found that it was too costly and difficult to transport the food out to the rural communities where the canteens were placed; instead, the suppliers took some percentage of the money for themselves and brought the rest of the money in cash to the schools, where the school management committees (CGS) used the money to purchase food in their own area or in nearby markets. It is unclear how much of the money intended for the food stayed in the hands of regional suppliers and how much went directly to the schools for local purchase. All of the CGSs in this study discovered that the state was going to be giving them food for the canteens when the supplier came to them with the money, and all of their communication for this period was with the suppliers, so the communities never knew how much money had been allocated at the national level, and were unable to check the appropriateness of the amount they received. Nevertheless, the communities seem reasonably pleased with this model, as it effectively turned a central procurement model into a local purchase one.

The three communities that have currently functional local purchase models are largely satisfied with the results, but there have been some problems with the systems that have used that model. For the academic year 2010-2011, the money from the national government was supposed to go

directly to local mayors' offices to then either purchase the food staples directly or disburse money to the CGS in order to purchase food for the canteen. This decision seems to have been left up to the mayors' discretion as part of Mali's decentralization process. The results of this process have been very mixed. The state-run canteens in Djenné all received the food that they were supposed to from their respective mayors. The canteens in these areas are operational, and the mayors said that although they occasionally had to purchase on credit and wait for the national government to reimburse suppliers, they had no difficulty in making the money available for the schools.

By contrast, in Macina, not a single one of the five state canteens was functional for this school year. Some of the communities had been able to collect food and money from the parents and village leaders in order to run the canteen for a few sessions—anywhere from a week to two months, but no money ever came from the mayors or from suppliers to support the canteens. The two mayors' offices who covered the five schools said that they were aware that there should be money from the state to support the canteens, but that they did not know how to access the money, and had made no effort to find out how to solve the problem. Both mayors were aware of the problem because the school directors and the CGS members had come to them to complain, but neither mayor had even attempted to get further information or direction. They both knew that they should go to the regional level representative of the Ministry of Finance with this kind of question, but neither had taken that step. It is difficult to know where the disconnect happened in Macina, but the fact that two mayors had the same reaction seems to indicate that it was not simply a problem of one disinterested official. Nevertheless, this is an example of how allowing one community member—in this case the mayor—to represent the whole creates dysfunction in the system because no single person can represent or respond to the needs of the entire community.

Recommendations

Move towards more locally-controlled procurement: communities that have more say over the food at the canteen are more satisfied with programming, and still likely to buy locally-produced food given the market structures in Mali. The CRS local-purchase pilot programme, and communities where money successfully comes through the mayor's office may provide a useful starting point for these procedures. Possibilities to consider in implementing local procurement are:

- Requiring that many, if not all, of the foodstuffs in local procurement are actually produced, and not just sold, locally;
- Helping the CGSs set up some kind of banking or accounting system to track where the money flows and provide transparency to the community;
- Using the many local radio stations or cell phones to communicate what the procurement requirements are and how much money went to a specific community so that the community can police procurement; and
- Training and assisting communities to select high quality products and store them effectively.

Local purchase is not a complete solution, as the Macina case shows, but with the correct communication and supervision it could allow for more community engagement in programme design and management, better outcomes in terms of meals provided, and more satisfied communities.

Design more flexible or more frequent enrolment projection systems: Updating student enrolment figures more frequently to account for increased enrolment because of school feeding would allow school feeding programmes to better meet community needs. This may be an important venue for technical assistance, since designing a flexible projection model requires a certain expertise. Nevertheless, it will allow for HGSF to accomplish two of its primary goals: increasing school enrolment and improving nutrition for more schoolchildren. Some ideas to consider are:

- Designating a person at the DNCS when it is functional to monitor enrolment on a quarterly or semi-annual basis, either using the existing systems[4] through the CAP or with some direct call-in mechanism; and
- Designing a funding structure that plans for an increase in enrolment annually based on past data for school feeding in Mali and the current enrolment rates in the area. This structure might automatically put more of the budget into the second semester to account for enrolment increases.

[4] The CAPs report enrollment figures and attendance to the DNEB on a quarterly basis, but the office does not have the manpower to read through all of the reports and make changes accordingly.

Communications

Some aspects of the communications structures in Mali are working. For example, the sensitization procedures for explaining to communities their roles and responsibilities in the daily management of the programmes is effective. Every community that had a canteen was aware of someone coming to tell them about their roles. Additionally, information is flowing throughout the system, because all nine communities did not have canteens knew about school feeding and what its benefits were. Mostly they had heard about school feeding from friends, relatives, and colleagues who lived in places with canteens. These formal and informal systems may provide useful templates for how to communicate other information to the community level, since there are clear blockages in the communications systems.

Challenges

Without effective communication between the communities and the national level there is no way for the communities to engage in programming or for the system to be accountable to communities. Communications structures may be passive interventions that are insufficient to guarantee community engagement, but they are a necessary first step. Despite some successes, there are four main problems with communications systems in the Mali school feeding programmes: one-way communication, bottlenecks, partners failing to use existing communications structures, and technical challenges.

First, the communications systems that exist nearly all pull information up to the national level, but do not send it back to the communities. Currently, the National Coordinator for School Feeding under the DNEB works to collect information from all of the lower administrative levels, as well as to coordinate with other partners and Ministries. He does pass the reports on to the major partners, who may use that information in their strategies. However, these reports do not move back down to the community level, and neither do the strategies that develop out of them. For example, only two communities could site what the implementing partner was planning to do for the next few years in the community—if there was a withdrawal or a scale-down planned. Both of these communities were involved in the local-purchase models, so either local purchase improves engagement and communication enough that communities can learn strategies, or CRS—the partner in these communities—has done a clearer job of communicating to communities.

Second, while CCs are generally an extremely important and visible link for communities, they are often a bottleneck to information because they lack capacity and the power to influence decisions. As Figure 5 demonstrates, schools have direct ties with the canteen coordinators (CC), who often provide information to all actors, and who have the most complete picture of

what is happening in their district because of their frequent contact with the schools. However, communities have difficulty accessing any other actors. CGS members mention that they may see a representative from an NGO at the very beginning of the process—sensitization around community roles in a canteen—and at roughly annual evaluations. Otherwise, they communicate largely with the CC. While all of the communities felt that it was easy to get in touch with the CC to try to address a problem, if the CC could not solve a problem himself, they had no way to contact anyone else. All of the communities cited at least one problem that the CC could not address alone, which demonstrates critical flaws in the system.

Other than the CC, not a single community was able to indicate who they could speak to in case of a problem, or who made decisions about what happened at their canteen. If they have a problem—such as a failed delivery or a change in enrolment that requires more food, or want to register an opinion about the way the programme is running, all of the communities cited the same process to resolve it. First, they convene the CGS and then the local community to see if there is any way for them to fill in the gaps on their end by collecting extra money from parents or having a chief provide money or food to the school, or making a change in their own management process. If this is insufficient, the only thing communities know to do is go to the one of their district-level contacts. If that person cannot resolve the problem, it simply does not get resolved. Every focus group in all eleven communities with canteens in the survey cited this as their interaction with the national level, no matter which partner their primary funder was. This demonstrates a critical flaw in communications and community engagement strategies, because the CC may be able to pass information on to the national level, but that information does not translate into action. Genuine community engagement requires not just accepting complaints, but also allowing community feedback to influence programming.

One reason that the CC cannot always address problems is that the policy framework does not set up formal ties between the CC and the other partners. Another reason is that the CCs are often overstretched. The Macina CC is not only in charge of canteens in his district, but also the math curriculum and the quality of math teaching for the entire district. The Djenné CC is responsible for supervising 85 canteens singlehandedly. Even when the CCs manage to get through to the national level, there is currently only one feeding coordinator at the national level. He alone cannot handle all of the decision making for 1520 canteens in the country, or even the 651 that the GOM covers.

Third, many government officials at the district level feel that partners skip over them entirely to go out to schools and build canteens without any reference to district plans or systems. This is especially true for the smaller partners who run only a few canteens, and for the implementing NGOs that many of the major financial partners hire. There is general concern that the government is left out of the loop, especially in the creation phase of a canteen. This communication failure not only makes it difficult for the CAP to do its job, but also raises questions about what the selection process actually is.

Fourth, even when information makes it to the local level, there are technical challenges to getting it to the village—and in the community getting information to the national level in a format they will accept. With respect to communication from the district level to the community, communication in rural Mali is certainly a challenge, and many of the communications difficulties come from the fact that communities are simply not tied into any modern communications systems. There may be only one or two people in the village who have cell phones, and there is no way to reach the CGS other than to physically go to the village or have a CGS member come into a more central location. Similarly, most CGS members are illiterate, and so the community cannot send in formal written reports unless they go through the school director.

Operating from the community to the district, the same problems of phones and literacy cause problems. Without formal written reports from the community, many of the more central-level actors do not act on a reported problem, because it is unofficial. When CAP Directors or CC want to communicate with other actors on their own level or with more national actors, they often have difficulty getting traction. The officials, especially the CCs, feel that there is little responsiveness from the national level on concerns they have.

Recommendations

Improve communication from the national level to the community at all stages of the process. There needs to be a communication mechanism where communities can reach national level actors and see national actors respond. Possibilities include:

- Strengthening the existing chain from the CAP coordinators to the national level by providing more resources and capacity to the local level;
- Creating an external system for communities to reach national actors to alleviate the bottleneck. One possibility is a publicised national call-in complaint centre, in cases where the current chains of communication are blocked or the CC feels he cannot get traction. Giving communities a number at headquarters they can call with a complaint has been a partially effective tool in the Osun State feeding programme in Nigeria[xxix];
- Capitalizing on the existing structures that implementers use when they set up canteens, and using them for more frequent meetings and communications of strategic plans and national information; and,

- Using local radio to reach large segments of the population and broadcast expectations, programme goals, and strategies. This might help not only with communication, but also with procurement, since it would allow for both transparency in criteria and community knowledge of how to engage in designing a system.

Move toward stronger downward accountability: For all of the partners in Mali, most of the programme interventions fall into the passive category of downward accountability structures at all stages. Implementers should move toward more active interventions that require and allow genuine community participation. Communication systems should be two-way, and not simply a way for national actors to extract information from the local level. National actors may need to adjust their strategies based on the feedback communities give. If they do not change, or clearly communicate the reason that they did not change, the community may assume that the communication is not working at all.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The currently outlined M&E system draws on a fairly comprehensive set of indicators, both in terms of education and local agricultural production. Some of these indicators are not especially operational—for example, the "organization and good functioning of the canteen"—but they do cover the importance of local purchase and agricultural development in the HGSF programme, which is a problem many other nations have struggled with. The DNCS will have to delineate more specific outcome measures, but the overarching ideas are present in the policy. At the local level, communities monitor their own stocks and performance, and are uniformly happy with this as a model.

Challenges

Despite a reasonable framework for how M&E *should* happen, this policy is not yet in place. The current system has a limited capacity to process all of the information that comes through the central level, has no functional way of processing agricultural indicators, and does not send information back down to the community level.

Currently, M&E data is captured in the same way that current evaluation of educational metrics takes place: the CGS collects data which it passes to the CAP and the AE, which will in turn send the information to the national level. The CGSs send a monthly report to the CAP—usually through the school director—which in turn sends a quarterly report to the national level. Given the lack of staff at the central level, it is doubtful whether the national staff can absorb all of the information from all 1520 canteens, but the system is in place for when there is a broader human capital dedicated to school feeding.

Because the agricultural measurements are traditionally outside the purview of this structure, those metrics are be especially difficult to capture through this system. In order to guarantee good data collection, either there will need to be training and capacity support in order to ensure that these actors accurately capture agricultural measurements or the system may need to find another way to gather agricultural data. As yet, no one could offer any examples of ways agricultural data of any kind was connected to school feeding.

Additionally, there is a plan to create a National Committee for Reflection and Orientation (CNRO) to coordinate the data and measure the successful implementation of canteens at the national level. This committee will have members from DNEB, the MoE's Statistics and Planning Unit (CPS), the Administrative and Financial Directorate (DAF), the National Education Centre (CNE), the National Centre for Non-Formal Education Resources (CNR-EF), the support unit for Education Decentralization (CAD/DE), the Malian Municipalities Association, and the High Council for Territorial Collectives, as well as Mali's technical and financial partners. The fact that neither the DNCS nor the Ministry of Agriculture and its structures are included in this proposed evaluation and orientation committee pose a worry about how effective the system will be, and how balanced its judgements based on relative criteria are.

Communities have no real sense of how what monitoring or evaluation goes on. They know that a local person is in control of the stock once it reaches the village, but that is all. This means communities cannot appreciate the full extent of what the program does, nor can they engage in the process effectively, either as stakeholders in the design and management phases or as whistleblowers. If the communities knew how many meals the implementers said they were serving to how many children, they would be able either to verify that those numbers were correct, or to say that they did not receive those quantities. Knowing that the central level claimed to feed 100 children in a school that has 150 would provide the community with a way to push for more staples or agricultural support. On the other end of the spectrum, if a partner's reports stated that they had fed 200 children in a school that had 150, the community would know that somehow the food or money were being diverted somewhere in the process, and be able to work with the partner to solve the problem.

Recommendations

Build capacity for M&E: Partners, especially the DNCS when it exists, should be thinking about how to have enough manpower to absorb all of the information that comes to the national level, and how to bring on specialized agricultural expertise to operationalize and interpret agricultural indicators.

Treat M&E as a two-way process: Actors at the top of the chain should use the existing M&E and communications systems to send information back to the community level. This should help communities recognize the importance of their accomplishments and feel more ownership over the results. It will also help implementers to think about making information available in formats that are appropriate for local consumption.

PART 4: BROADER RECCOMENDATIONS

While the school feeding programmes in Ghana and Mali operate in very different ways and have their own strengths and weaknesses, looking at them together through the lens of community engagement highlights a few main concerns and paths forward for school feeding generally. Notably, the programmes share four main areas of potential problems in community engagement:

- Policy Frameworks: the legal systems, agreements between partners, and institutional arrangements that surround school feeding programming and the actors within it;
- Procurement Systems: the methods by which food arrives in communities;
- Communications: how different kinds of partners communicate with each other, and how national, district, and community level partners communicate across the levels; and
- Monitoring and Evaluation: who collects information, what kind of information goes into monitoring a programme, and how actors chose to share and use this information.

Given the structure of school feeding programmes and the way they operate, these are programme areas likely to harbour obstacles to school feeding systems in many countries. In addition to substantive areas where there are potential roadblocks, it is helpful to think about which phase of programming is creating roadblocks to community engagement in school feeding systems: defining needs, designing interventions, daily management, and monitoring and evaluation. To this end, we have laid out five main focus areas for general recommendations, each with a subset of improvements to consider:

- Diagnosis
- Policy Framework
- Procurement Systems
- Communications
- Monitoring and Evaluation

Diagnosing Community Engagement Problems

Solving problems of community engagement to improve programme impact first requires understanding where the bottlenecks exist. Each system will have its own strengths and weaknesses, and there is no one solution that will improve all programmes. This requires diagnosis of what problems exist and where. To do this, implementers should:

- Use the provided diagnostic tools in a broad section of communities to identify specific obstacles in the system;
- Consider which stages of the process—defining, designing, managing, and evaluating—are most and least effectively engaging the community. Lessons from the phases where community engagement is robust may help strengthen the weaker parts of the system. This will also provide a guide to which existing strategies might be most helpful to solve the existing process (See Figure 2).
- Conduct interviews with different stakeholders at different implementation levels in separate sessions to get a clear picture of the wide variety of viewpoints that exist in the system; and
- Be as context-specific as possible when designing strategies to solve problems.

Policy Frameworks:

Policy frameworks are often the basis on which all other activities build, and it is important to pay particular attention to both the design and implementation of these frameworks. Some recommendations are:

- **Consistency**: Communities cannot effectively own programmes or serve as watchdogs to discover problems if they do not understand what the rules of the system are. Having multiple versions of the rules of the game, or changing them frequently, subverts the communities' ability to participate in the programme, and undermines many of the benefits community engagement brings to the table. In terms of school feeding, strategies to improve consistency are to:
    - Create and publicise transparent, consistent, and apolitical criteria and processes for community selection, provider hiring, and regular funding disbursement.

- Negotiate a set of operational systems that all implementing partners agree to adopt; and
- Define "local" in a clear and consistent way, and publicise that definition to partners and communities.

- **Inclusiveness:** Having consistent policies most helpful if the right actors are involved. This is especially true for HGSF, which requires a complex set of interactions between many stakeholders. It is important for implementers to strengthen ties between school feeding and the Ministry of Agriculture at all levels.

- **Implementation**: While any policy framework has weaknesses, in many cases the challenge is not to redesign policy, but rather implementing existing policies. Any work on policy design will not matter if there is no effective way of, or commitment to, implementing the rules on paper. Implementation is always a challenge for policy makers, and considering how to implement the policy as part of its design process may help improve results. Additionally, actors should fully implement the existing policy frameworks.

Procurement Systems:

As an essential part of school feeding, and one that has many different actors and is prone to leakage, procurement systems merit particular attention when looking at community engagement in school feeding. It is both an area that is inherently difficult, and one where involving communities can be very meaningful, both in the sense of building ownership and having a "watchdog" role. In order to facilitate community engagement here, implementers should consider:

- Developing transparent and consistent procurement procedures across country programmes and partners. This will make it easier to communicate expectations and rules to the community, and to build systems where communities can effectively interact.
- Moving towards community directed procurement whenever possible. This not only improves community engagement, but also furthers the HGSF goals of building local agriculture and market mechanisms. However, this will only work if implementers pay careful attention to checks and balances on local level procurement systems.
- Designing a readily accessible complaints procedure for procurement problems. In order to be effective, the system needs to have ways for even illiterate and geographically removed actors to be able to voice a complaint. One potential model is a call-in

complaints system or a text system using mobile phones. However, simply allowing people to voice a complaint is not enough; this system will only be workable if it triggers a timely response from specific actors.

Communications:

Communities can only engage if they understand what the expectations and operational capacities are for a school feeding system. Without a clear understanding of the programming, downward accountability will be limited at best, and harmful at worst. Some techniques to improve communications are:

- Create widely distributed and community-legible communications strategies about programme goals, resources, and actors. Because of language, literacy, and technology issues, the kinds of strategy documents that implementers submit to funders are typically not useful at the community level. Implementers need to think of ways to represent information that will both reach communities and make sense to them (for example, radio shows rather than written documents held at the district office).
- Improve communications between different kinds of stakeholders at the community and national levels. Programmes are likely to be more effective if the actors who are currently siloed by organization and speciality (for example teachers, cooks, and parents) work together. Well-run community management committees can help overcome this by bringing actors together, but they are not a perfect solution. Also, the local level should not be the only place where different stakeholders interact.
- Build more effective communications systems between the national and local levels. This is a particularly problematic area, especially given gaps in communications technology and expertise. However, community engagement cannot reach its full potential if communities cannot contact the central decision-making level.

Monitoring and Evaluation:

Who collects information, what kind of information goes into monitoring a programme, and how actors chose to share and use this information has huge implications for the ways communities can engage and work to make programmes better meet their needs. In order to maximise community involvement in monitoring and evaluation, implementers should:

- Involve the communities in all parts of the M&E process. Simply having communities report how many children are fed misses important goals that communities could be monitoring if they had a venue to communicate these issues.
- Treat M&E processes as two-way communication and a way to improve programming rather than simply data collection. Communities will have more incentive to be involved in M&E if they can see that their involvement results in real changes that improve the programming. This should result not only in better community engagement and ownership, but also in programmes that better meet community needs.

PART 5: APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS USED

Acronym	Name
AE	Teaching Academy/Academie d'Enseignement
AME	Mothers' Association/ Association des Meres d'Enfants
APE	Parents' Association/ Association des Parents d'Enfants
CAD/DE	Support Unit for Education Decentralization
CAP	Center for Pedagogic Instruction/ Centre d'Apprentissage Pedagogique
CC	Canteen Technician/Charge des Cantines
CGS	School Management Commitee Committee de Gestion Scolaire
CNE	National Education Centre
CNR-EF	National Centre for Non-Formal Education Resources
CNRO	National Committee for Reflection and Orientation
CPS	Statistics and Planning Unit
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DA	District Assembly
DAF	Administrative and Financial Directorate
DCAP	CAP Director
DCE	District Chief Executive
DDO	District Desk Officer

* Research Fellow, Partnership for Child Development, Imperial College
** PhD Candidate, Chair of Logistics Management (Kuehne Foundation endowed Chair) at WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
*** School Feeding Unit, Policy, Planning and Strategy Division, World Food Programme
**** School Feeding Unit, Policy, Planning and Strategy Division, World Food Programme

DIC	District Implementation Committee
DNCS	National Direction for School Canteens/ Direction National des Cantines Scolaires
DNEB	National Direction for Basic Education/ Direction National de l'Education de Base
EFA	Education for All
FCFA	West African Franc (conversion rate is about 480 FCFA to 1 USD)
GOG	Government of Ghana
GOM	Government of Mali
GSFP	Ghana School Feeding Programme
HGSF	Home Grown School Feeding
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millenium Development Goals
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoFA	Ministry of Food and Agriculture
MoFEP	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MoLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
NCSC	National Coordinator for School Canteens
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PCD	Partnership for Child Development
PDDR-NM	Decennial Regional Development Plan for Northern Mali
PDES	Social and Economic Development Plan
PETS	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PRA	Participatory Rural Assessment
SEND	Social Enterprise Development Organization

SF	School Feeding
SIC	School Implementation Committee
SMC	School Management Committee
SNV	Netherlands Development Organization
TC	Territorial Collectives
WFP	World Food Programme

APPENDIX B: RESEARCH TOOLS USED IN FIELDWORK: JANUARY 2011

1: Policy Maker Survey, English

HGSF SURVEY FOR POLICY MAKERS, MANAGERS AND IMPLEMENTERS

INTRODUCTION

The Partnership for Child Development (PCD) based at Imperial College London is providing support to Governments in selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in response to their requests for technical support to evaluate their national School Feeding Programmes. This instrument is intended to be used to collect data from policy makers and managers and implementers of school feeding (including the home grown school feeding) programmes.

Before the questionnaire is actually administered, we would like to pre-test to ensure that the questions are relevance and comprehensively measure what is intended. We would like to request/invite you, as a Policy Maker [ ], Programme Manager [ ] and/or Implementer [ ], to help us improve this tool by answering all the questions intended for policy makers. At the end of the interview, we would like to briefly discuss your concerns, if any, with regard to, for example, question clarity, phrasing, organization, relevance and coverage. We would be most grateful if you would suggest ways of improving this tool.

Do you have any question before we begin?

Date of interview: Day/Month/Year

Name of interviewer:

Category of respondent:

1. Policy maker / 2. Manager / 3. Implementer/ 4. Community Member: __Parent __ Farmer

SECTION I - GENERAL INFORMATION OF RESPONDENTS

This section asks for general information about you.

1. Gender of respondent: 1. Female / 2.Male

2. What is your place and country of residence?

3. What is your highest educational qualification? (Only one response)

1. None, /2. Primary /3 Secondary (lower) /4. High school (Upper) 5.Post-Secondary/high School [e.g., mid-level – certificate - diploma college); 6. Bachelors degree/6. Masters degree 7. PhD /8. Other (please specify) _____

4. What Organization/Institution do you work for? Name

5. What is the level of your work operations?

1. National / 2. Regional / 3. District l4. Other (please specify) _____

SECTION II - RESPONDENT KNOWLEDGE, PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES OF HOME GROWN SCHOOL FEEDING (HGSF) PROGRAMMES

II - 1.1 RESPONDENT'S KNOWLEDGE

1. What do you know about home grown school feeding? In your view, what are the main benefits of School Feeding Programmes at the community level?

2. In your opinion, what are the benefits of involving the community in the implementation of HGSF? (multiple choice allowed)

1. ENSURES SUSTAINABILITY □

2. TRANSFORMATIVE EFFECTS (i.e. improvement of gender relations) □

3. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (i.e. through employment generation) □

4. NO BENEFITS. □

5. OTHERS (Please specify):

.....

.....

.....

3. What do you mean by "local food" in HGSF programmes? (multiple choice allowed)

1. Produced in the same community as the school □
2. Produced in a region within the country □
3. Produced within the country □
4. Other (please specify) _____

4. In your view, what are the added benefits of the home-grown component of SF? (multiple responses allowed)

1. Improving incomes of local farmers □
2. Increasing school enrolment □

3. Improving nutritional status of children □

4. No benefits □

5. Other (Please specify) _____

5. In your view, who should provide food to schools in the communities covered by HGSF programmes? (multiple responses allowed)

1. Large (National) suppliers □

2. Traders □

3. Caterers □

4. Farmer´s associations/cooperatives □

5. Small farmers □

6. Other (Please specify) _____

6. In your opinion, what is the best way that donors can support HGSF programmes?

(multiple choice allowed)

1. BY PROVIDING FUNDING □

2. BY PROVIDING TECHNICAL SUPPORT □

3. OTHER. Please specify: □

.....

.....

.....

7. In your opinion, are there any factors that prevent small farmers from participating in Home-grown School Feeding programmes?

1. Yes □

2. No □

If answered YES, please explain:

.....

.....

.....

II - 2 RESPONDENTS' PERCEPTIONS

8. In your opinion, what level of government should be responsible for implementing Home-grown School Feeding programmes?

A. National level □

B. Provincial level □

C. District level □

D. Divisional level □

E. School level □

F. Community level □

9. In your opinion, should stakeholders participate in the implementation of HGSF programmes?

1.Yes □

2. No □

If YES, Please specify which ones:

.....
.....
.....

10. What problems have you seen with the HGSF programme? How would you like to see them resolved?

.....
.....
.....

III PARTICIPATION

11. How is the community involved in the design/implementation of the programme?

12. What other mechanisms exist for communication between stakeholders at the regional, district, and community level?

13. When you encounter difficulties in the implementation of HGSF, how can you respond?

14. Who can you contact about your concerns?

15. If your concerns are not met, what are alternative avenues for raising them?

16. Who is most likely to bring a problem to your attention?

Parents groups []

Community/school officials []

District officials []

Regional officials []

National officials []

Other []

II. 3 PRACTICES

* ALL QUESTIONS ARE RELATED TO THE HGSF IN THE COUNTRY OF THE RESPONDENT.

17. Are the objectives of the HGSF programme clearly specified in programme documents (e.g. policy/strategy documents)?

1. YES □

2. NO □

If NO, please specify what is missing?

.....

.....

.....

18. Are you following specific guidelines for the implementation of the HGSF programme?

1. YES □

2. NO □

3. DON´T KNOW □

If YES, what guidelines specify the procedures for public procurement of food?
.....
.....
.....

19. What alternative policy, if any, would you suggest for achieving the same goals of HGSF?

.....
.....
.....

20. Who are the key stakeholders involved in the implementation of HGSF (Please name at most five)?

.....
.....
.....

21. How would you rate coordination between different stakeholders (different Ministries, NGOs, donors) in the implementation of the HGSF and why?

	Across Ministries	NGOs	Donors
1. Very good	----------	_____	____
2. Good	----------	_____	____
3. Average	----------	_____	_____
4. Poor	----------	_____	_____
5. Very poor	----------	_____	_____

Please specify why:

.....

.....

.....

22. How would you rate the coordination between government agencies at different levels (National, District, Community...) in the implementation of the HGSF programme?

	National	District	Community
1. Very good	----------	_____	____
2. Good	----------	_____	____
3. Average	----------	_____	_____
4. Poor	----------	_____	_____
5. Very poor	----------	_____	_____

23. What in your view are the reasons why? :

24. Are you following specific guidelines for the implementation of the HGSF programme?

1. YES □

2. NO □

3. DON´T KNOW □

If YES, what guidelines the guidelines specify the procedures for public procurement of food?

If NO, why not?

.....

.....
.....

25. In your opinion what are the main difficulties experienced in your programme with regard to the implementation of HGSF programmes and why? (multiple responses allowed)

1. LACK OF CAPACITY □
2. LACK OF UNDERSTANDING □
3. LACK OF DEFINED ROLE □
4. LACK OF FUNDING □

Please specify:

.....
.....
.....

26. What is the mechanism, if any, that ensures transparency in the administration of HGSF programmes?

.....
.....
.....

27. Are there guidelines of the HGSF programme that specifically instruct the purchase of locally produced food? □

1. YES
2. NO
3. DON´T KNOW

28. Who is formally designated the responsibility for food procurement? (multiple responses allowed)

1. National authorities □
2. Provincial authorities □
3. District authorities □
4. Community/School authorities □
5. Private firm □
6. No one □
7. Other (please specify)

.....
.....
.....

29. Within the current HGSF programme of your country who is actually procuring food? (multiple choice allowed)

1. National authorities □
2. Provincial authorities □
3. District authorities □
4. Community/School authorities □
5. Private firm □
6. Not defined □
7. Other (please specify)

.....
.....
.....

30. Within the current HGSF programme who supplies the food?

(multiple responses allowed)

1. Large suppliers (National suppliers) □
2. Traders □
3. Caterers □
4. Farmer´s associations □
5. Small farmers □
6. Other (please specify): □

.....

.....

.....

31. What is the level of involvement of communities in the implementation of the HGSF programme?

1. High □
2. Medium □
3. None □

If 1 or 2, what are the roles and responsibilities of the community?

.....

.....

.....

32. What are the main sources of funding of the current HGSF programme? (multiple choice allowed)

Please indicate approximate percentage:

1. National Government:.....%

2. Donors:..... %

3. NGOs:..... %

4. Communities:..... %

5. Others (please specify):.....%

33. To what extent do donors influence goals setting and the day-to-day management of HGSF programmes? How do they influence goals setting?

1. High □

2. Medium □

3. Low □

4. None □

5. Other (please specify):

.....

.....

.....

34. To what extent do communities influence goals setting and the day-to-day management of HGSF programmes? How?

1. High □

2. Medium □

3. Low □

4. None □

5. Other (please specify):

.....

.....

.....

35. Is there a defined M&E mechanism/system within the HGSF programme?

1. YES □

2. NO □

3. I DON´T KNOW □

If YES, how does this system work?

36. In your opinion, how should HGSF programmes be monitored and evaluated?

.....

.....

.....

37. In your opinion, what are the benefits, if any, of involving the community in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of HGSF programmes? (multiple response allowed)

1. ENSURES SUSTAINABILITY □

2. IMPROVES THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION □

3. CONTRIBUTES TO THE EMPOWERMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES □

4. NONE □

5. OTHER (Please specify):

.....

.....

.....

38. Suppose you wanted to recommend that a program be modified, how could you make this recommendation?

39. Who would you talk to? How do you think they would respond?

40. Have you ever raised a concern about a programme in the community to an official or programme manager? If so, how did you do this? How did they respond?

2: Policy Maker Survey, French

ENQUÊTE ALISCO

Date de l'interview: Jour / Mois / Année

Nom de l'enquêteur:

Catégorie du répondant:

1. Décideur / 2. Manager / 3. Mise en œuvre / 4. Membre de la Communauté: __Parent _____ Agricole _

SECTION I - RENSEIGNEMENTS GÉNÉRAUX DES PARTICIPANTS

Cette section demande des renseignements à votre sujet.

1. Le sexe du répondant: 1. Homme / 2. Femme

2. Quel est votre lieu résidence ?

3. Quelle est votre plus haute niveau d'enseignement? (Une seule réponse)

1. Aucun, / 2. Primaire / Secondaire 3 (bas) / 4. d'études secondaires (Haute) 5.Post-Secondary/high école [par exemple, à mi-niveau - certificat - diplôme d'études collégiales); 6. Baccalauréat / 6. Maîtrise 7. PhD / 8. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser) _____

4. Pour quelle institution travaillez-vous?

5. Quel est le niveau de vos opérations de travail?

1. National / 2. Régional / 3. District 4. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser) _____

SECTION II - LES CONNAISSANCES, perceptions et pratiques des programmes d'ALIMENTATION SCOLAIRE A BASE DES PRODUITS LOCAUX (HGSF)

II - LES CONNAISSANCES 1,1

1. Qu'est-ce que vous savez par rapport a l'ALISCO ? À votre avis, quels sont les principaux avantages de programmes d'alimentation scolaire au niveau communautaire ?

2. À votre avis, quels sont les avantages de la participation de la communauté dans la mise en œuvre de HGSF? (Choix multiple possible)

1. DURABILITE ASSURE

2. Effets de transformation (ex : amélioration des relations entre les sexes)

3. DÉVELOPPEMENT ÉCONOMIQUE (à travers la création d'emplois)

4. AUCUN AVANTAGE.

5. AUTRES (S'il vous plaît préciser):

.....

.....

.....

3. Qu'entendez-vous par «aliments locaux» dans les programmes HGSF? (Choix multiple possible)

1. Produit dans la même communauté que l'école

2. Produit dans la même région que l'école

3. Produit dans le pays

4. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser) _____

4. À votre avis, quels sont les avantages supplémentaires de l'achat local pour l'alisco ?

(Plusieurs réponses possibles)

1. Augmenter les revenus des agriculteurs locaux

2. Augmenter scolarisation

3. Améliorer l'état nutritionnel des enfants

4. Pas de prestations

5. Autres (S'il vous plaît préciser) _____

5. À votre avis, qui devrait fournir de la nourriture aux écoles dans les communautés visées par les programmes HGSF? (Plusieurs réponses possibles)

1. Des grands fournisseurs au niveau national

2. Des petits commerçants

3. Des cuisinières

4. Des associations / coopératives des agriculteurs

5. Les petits agriculteurs

6. Autres (S'il vous plaît préciser) _____

6. À votre avis, quelle est la meilleure façon que les donateurs peuvent utiliser pour soutenir les programmes HGSF?

(Choix multiple possible)

1. FINANCEMENT

2. EN DONNANT le Soutien TECHNIQUE

3. AUTRES. S'il vous plaît préciser:

....

....

....

7. À votre avis, y a t-il des facteurs qui empêchent les petits agriculteurs de participer aux Programmes ALISCO?

1. Oui

2. Non

Si la réponse est OUI, pouvez vous expliquer svp :

....
....
....
....
.....

II – 2 PERCEPTIONS

8. À votre avis, quel niveau de gouvernement devrait être responsable de la mise en œuvre des programmes d'alimentation scolaire ?

A. Au niveau national ;

B. niveau regional ;

C au niveau du cercle ;

D. niveau de la commune ;

E. niveau de l'école ;

F. niveau communautaire

9. À votre avis, est ce que les parties prenantes doivent participer à la mise en œuvre des programmes Alisco?

1. Oui

2. Non

Si OUI, S'il vous plaît préciser lesquels:

....
....
....
....

10. Quelles interventions complémentaires, le cas échéant, proposeriez-vous pour soutenir les objectifs de HGSF?

....
....
....
....
.....

III PARTICIPATION

11. Comment la communauté est impliquée dans la conception / mise en œuvre du

programme?

12. Quels autres mécanismes existent pour la communication entre les parties prenantes au niveau régional, du district et au niveau communautaire?

13. Lorsque vous rencontrez des difficultés dans la mise en œuvre de ALISCO, comment faites-vous pour y faire face ?

14. A qui vous adressez vous au sujet des préoccupations que vous avez sur le programme?

15. Si vos préoccupations ne sont pas prises en comptes, quelles sont des voies alternatives pour les lever?

A quel niveau rencontre t-on le plus de blocages dans la mise en œuvre du programme ?

Quand il y a un problème, qui est ce qui habituellement le signale ?

Y a t-il des liens avec les personnes qui interviennent dans le programme ?

Si oui, lesquelles ?

35. Qui est le plus probable d'entraîner un problème à votre attention?

Les groupes de parents []

Les fonctionnaires de la communauté scolaire / []

Les autorités du district []

Les fonctionnaires régionaux []

Les fonctionnaires nationaux []

Autres []

36. Si quelqu'un pose encore un problème, comment réagissez-vous?

II. 3 PRATIQUES

17. Les objectifs du programme ALISCO sont ils clairement spécifiés dans les documents de programme (politique par exemple les documents de stratégie /)?

1. OUI

2. NON

Si NON, s'il vous plaît préciser ce qui manque?

....
....
....
....

18. Suivez-vous les lignes directrices spécifiques pour la mise en œuvre du programme ALISCO?

1. OUI

2. NON

3. NE SAIT PAS

Si OUI, quelles lignes directrices précisent les procédures de passation des marchés publics de la nourriture? .....

....
....
....
....

19. Quelle alternative, le cas échéant, proposeriez-vous pour atteindre les mêmes objectifs de ALISCO?

....
....
....
.....
.....

20. Qui sont les acteurs clés impliqués dans la mise en œuvre de ALISCO ?

....
....
....
....

21. Comment qualifieriez-vous la coordination entre les différents acteurs (différents ministères, ONG, bailleurs de fonds) dans la mise en œuvre de la ALISCO et pourquoi?

Dans

Ministères ONG donateurs

1. Très bon ---------- _____ ____

2. Bonne ---------- _____ ____

3. Moyenne ---------- _____ _____

4. Mauvais ---------- _____ _____

5. Très mauvaise ---------- _____ _____

S'il vous plaît préciser pourquoi:

....
....
....
....
.....

22. Comment évaluez-vous la coordination entre les organismes gouvernementaux à différents niveaux (national, district, communautaire ...) dans la mise en œuvre du programme ALISCO?

Communauté /District /National

1. Très bon ---------- _____ ____

2. Bonne ---------- _____ ____

3. Moyenne ---------- _____ _____

4. Mauvais ---------- _____ _____

5. Très mauvais ---------- _____ _____

23. A votre avis, quelles en sont les raisons ?

24. Suivez-vous les lignes directrices spécifiques pour la mise en œuvre du programme ALISCO ?

1. OUI

2. NON

3. NE SAIT PAS

Si OUI, quelles lignes directrices Les lignes directrices précisent les procédures de passation des marchés publics de la nourriture? Si NON, pourquoi pas? ....
....
....
.....

25. A votre avis quelles sont les principales difficultés rencontrées dans votre programme en ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre des programmes ALISCO et pourquoi? (Plusieurs réponses possibles)

1. Manque de capacité

2. Manque de compréhension

3. MANQUE DE rôle défini

4. Manque de financement

S'il vous plaît précisez:

....
....
....
....

26. Quel est le mécanisme, le cas échéant, qui assure la transparence dans l'administration des programmes ALISCO?

....

....

....

....

27. Y a t-il des lignes directrices du programme ALISCO spécifiquement en rapport avec l'achat d'aliments produits localement?

1. OUI

2. NON

3. NE SAIT PAS

28. Qui est officiellement responsable de l'approvisionnement alimentaire? (Plusieurs réponses possibles)

1. Les autorités nationales ;

2. Les autorités régionales ;

3. Les autorités communales ;

4. Cabinet privé

5. Nul

6. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser)

....

....

....

....

29. Dans le programme ALISCO actuel de votre pays qui est en charge de l'approvisionnement en vivres ? (Choix multiple possible)

1. Les autorités nationales ;

2. Les autorités régionales ;

3. Les autorités communales ;

4. Cabinet privé

5. Nul

6. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser)

....
....
....
....

30. Dans le programme actuel qui fournit la nourriture?

(Plusieurs réponses possibles)

1. Les gros fournisseurs (fournisseurs nationaux) ;

2. Les collecteurs régionaux ;

3. Traiteurs

4. Les cooperatives d'agriculteurs ;

5. Les petits agriculteurs ;

6. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser):

....
....
....
....

31. Quel est le niveau d'implication des communautés dans la mise en œuvre du programme ALISCO?

1. Haut

2. Moyenne

3. Aucun

Si 1 ou 2, quels sont les rôles et les responsabilités de la communauté?

....
....
....
....

32. Quelles sont les principales sources de financement du programme actuel ALISCO? (Choix multiple possible)

S'il vous plaît indiquez le pourcentage approximatif:

1. Gouvernement national :.....%

2. Les bailleurs de fonds :..... ..... %

3. ONG :..... ..... %

4. Communautés :..... ..... %

Colectivites locales (communes)

5. Autres (précisez s'il vous plaît):..... .....%

33. Dans quelle mesure les bailleurs de fonds influence la determination des objectifs et la gestion quotidienne des programmes ALISCO? Comment influencent-ils la fixation des objectifs?

1. Haut

2. Moyenne

3. Faible

4. Aucun

5. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser):

....

....

....

....

34. Dans quelle mesure les communautés influencent ils les objectifs et la gestion quotidienne des programmes ALISCO? Comment?

1. Haut

2. Moyenne

3. Faible

4. Aucun

5. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser):

....

....

....

....

35. Y a-t-il un mécanisme de M&E définie / système dans le programme ALISCO?

1. OUI

2. NON

3. JE NE SAIS PAS

Si OUI, comment fonctionne ce système?

36. À votre avis, comment devraient-ils, les programmes ALISCO être suivis et évalués?

....
....
....

37. À votre avis, quels sont les avantages, le cas échéant, d'impliquer la communauté dans le suivi et l'évaluation (M & E) des programmes ALISCO? (Réponses multiples possibles)

1. DURABILITE ASSURE

2. AMÉLIORE LA QUALITÉ DE L'EVALUATION

3. Contribue à l'autonomisation DES COMMUNAUTÉS LOCALES

4. NONE

5. AUTRES (S'il vous plaît préciser):

....
....
....

38. Supposons que vous aviez des recommandations pour améliorer le programme. Comment pourriez-vous faire cette recommandation?

39. A qui aimeriez-vous parler de ces recommandations ? Comment pensez-vous qu'ils répondent?

40. Avez-vous déjà soulevé des préoccupations sur un programme dans la communauté à un fonctionnaire ou responsable de programme? Si oui, comment avez-vous fait? Comment ont-ils réagi?

3: Community Survey, English

HGSF SURVEY FOR COMMUNITIES

Date of interview: Day/Month/Year

Name of interviewer:

Category of respondent group:

Farmers_____ Parents_____ Educators_____

Do the members of the group represent a particular community institution (ie: farmers' cooperative, women's association, etc)? Yes_____ No_____

If Yes, what is its name and what type of organization is it?

1. Have you ever heard of School Feeding (SF)?

1. YES []

2. NO [] [If the respondent answers NO, please skip to section III of the questionnaire.]

If YES, from your point of view, what is school feeding?

.....

.....

.....

(1c) If YES, how did you hear about school feeding?

2. Have you ever heard of Home-grown School Feeding (HGSF)?

1. YES □

2. NO [If the respondent answers NO, please skip to section III of the questionnaire.] □

If YES, what is HGSF from your point of view?

.....

.....

.....

If YES, how did you hear about HGSF?

3. Do you have a SF/HGSF programme in your community?

4. How long has the SF/HGSF programme been here?

5. How is the programme administered? How does it work? What should the program be providing?

6. Who does the program benefit? Are these the right people?

7. What kinds of food are available through the program? How often? Should anything be different?

8. Where does the food come from? Who sells/prepares food for the program? Should this change?

9. Who makes decisions about the programme?

10. How do you contact the decision maker(s)?

11. How is the community involved in the design/implementation of the programme?

12. Are there regular meetings with the community to communicate about the programme? How often?

Never []

At the beginning of the programme []

Once a year []

Twice a year []

Once a month []

Other? []

13. What other mechanisms exist for communication between stakeholders at the regional, district, and community level?

14. How easy is it for you to find out information about HGSF programming in your area?

15. How do you participate in making decisions about or managing the HGSF programme?

16. If you had a choice, how would you change your participation in the programme management?

17. How much power do you have to make/influence decisions about the programme?

18. When you encounter difficulties in the implementation of HGSF, how can you respond?

19. Who can you contact about your concerns?

20. How much do people listen to and address your concerns?

Very []

Somewhat []

Not at all []

21. If your concerns are not met, what are alternative avenues for raising them?

22. How do you hear about problems in HGSF programming and implementation?

23. Who is most likely to bring a problem to your attention?

24. If someone else raises a problem, how do you respond?

25. Have you ever raised a concern about HGSF programming to a decision maker? If yes, describe the process. If NO, why not?

Did not have a concern []

Did not know how to raise the concern []

Could not find a person to listen []

Do not feel comfortable raising a concern []

26. How useful has the HGSF programme been for you?

Very []

Somewhat []

Not at all []

27. How has HGSF benefited you?

Children benefit []

Sell food to the programme []

Earn money from catering/supervising the school feeding []

Other []

28. What problems have you seen with the HGSF programme? How would you like to see them resolved?

29. What are the main sources of funding of the current HGSF programme? (multiple choice allowed)

Please indicate approximate percentage:

1. National Government:.....%

2. Donors:..... %

3. NGOs:..... %

4. Communities:..... %

5. Others (please specify):.....

30. To what extent do communities influence goals setting and the day-to-day management of HGSF programmes? How?

1. High □
2. Medium □
3. Low □
4. None □
5. Other (please specify):

.....
.....
.....

31. In your opinion, how should HGSF programmes be monitored and evaluated?

.....
.....
.....

32. In your opinion, what are the benefits, if any, of involving the community in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of HGSF programmes? (multiple response allowed)

1. ENSURES SUSTAINABILITY □
2. IMPROVES THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION □
3. CONTRIBUTES TO THE EMPOWERMENT OF LOCAL COMMUNITIES □
4. NONE □
5. OTHER (Please specify):

.....

.....

.....

4: Community Survey, French

ENQUÊTE ALISCO - Communautaire

Date de l'interview: Jour / Mois / Année

Nom de l'enquêteur:

Catégorie du groupe des répondants:

Parent _____ Agricole _____ Educateur_____

Est-ce que les membres de la groupe représentent un institution communautaire (ex : coopérative des vivriers, association des femmes, etc.) ? Oui_____Non_____

Si oui, quel est son nom et fonctionne ?

CHAPITRE I : CONNAISSANCES

1. Avez-vous déjà entendu parler de l'alimentation scolaire (SF)?

1. OUI []

2. NON [] [Si le répondant répond NON, s'il vous plaît passez à la section III du questionnaire.]

(1b) Si oui, de votre point de vue, qu'est-ce que c'est d'alimentation scolaire?

....

....

....

(1c) Si oui, comment avez-vous entendu parler le sujet de l'alimentation scolaire?

1. les responsables locaux

2. d'autres membres de la communauté

3. directeur de l'école / enseignants

4. radio / télévision

5. d'autres

....

....

....

2. Avez-vous déjà entendu parler de l'alimentation scolaire a base des produits locaux (HGSF)?

1. OUI

2. NON [Si le répondant répond NON, s'il vous plaît passez à la section III du questionnaire.]

Si OUI, quelle est HGSF à partir de votre point de vue?

.....

.....

....

Si oui, comment avez-vous entendu parler d'alimentation scolaire a base des produits locaux?

1. les responsables locaux

2. d'autres membres de la communauté

3. directeur de l'école / enseignants

4. radio / télévision

5. d'autres

....

....

....

3. Avez-vous un programme ALISCO dans votre communauté?

4. Depuis combien de temps est-ce que le programme ALISCO est ici?

5. Comment le programme est administré? Comment marche-t-il ? Le programme, quelles choses doit-il donne au communauté ?

6. Qui bénéficient du programme ? Est-ce qu'ils sont les bons bénéficiaires ?

7. Quelles types de vivres sont disponibles a travers le programme ? Avec quel périodicité ? Est-ce qu'il y a besoin de changements ?

8. D'ou vient la nourriture ? Qui vend et qui prépare la nourriture ? Est-ce que cela doit changer ?

9. Qui prend les décisions au sujet du programme?

10. Quelles sont les principales sources de financement du programme actuel ALISCO? (Choix multiple possible)

S'il vous plaît indiquez le pourcentage approximatif:

1. Gouvernement national :.....%

2. Les bailleurs de fonds :..... ..... %

3. ONG :..... ..... %

4. Communautés :..... ..... %

5. Autres (précisez s'il vous plaît):..... .....%

CHAPITRE II : PARTICIPATION

11. Comment communiquez-vous avec le (les) décideur (s)?

12. Comment la communauté est impliquée dans la conception / mise en œuvre du programme?

13. Y a t-il des réunions régulières avec la communauté de communiquer au sujet du programme? Combien de fois?

Jamais []

Au début du programme []

Une fois par an []

Deux fois par an []

Une fois par mois []

Autres? []

14. Quels autres mécanismes existent pour la communication entre les parties prenantes au niveau régional, du district et au niveau communautaire?

15. Est-ce qu'il est facile pour vous de trouver des informations sur la programmation

ALISCO dans votre région?

16. Comment est-ce que vous participer à la prise des décisions concernant la gestion du programme ALISCO?

17. Si vous aviez le choix, comment auriez-vous modifier votre participation à la gestion du programme?

18. Quelle est votre capacité à influencer les décisions au sujet du programme?

19. Lorsque vous rencontrez des difficultés dans la mise en œuvre de ALISCO, comment faites-vous pour y faire face ?

20. A qui vous adressez vous au sujet des préoccupations que vous avez sur le programme?

21. Est-ce que les gens écoutent et répondent à vos préoccupations?

22. Si vos préoccupations ne sont pas prises en compte, quelles sont des voies alternatives pour les lever?

CHAPITRE III : BENIFICES ET DEFIS

23. Quelle est l'utilité du programme a été ALISCO pour vous?

Très []

Un peu []

Pas du tout []

24. Comment a ALISCO-vous bénéficié?

Les enfants bénéficient []

Vendre de la nourriture au programme []

Gagnez de l'argent de la restauration / supervision des programmes d'alimentation scolaire []

Autres []

25. Comment avez-vous entendu parler de problèmes dans la programmation et la mise en œuvre ALISCO ?

26. A quel niveau rencontre t-on le plus de blocages dans la mise en œuvre du programme ?

27. Quand il y a un problème, qui est ce qui habituellement le signale ?

28. Y a t-il des liens avec les personnes qui interviennent dans le programme ?

Si oui, lesquelles ?

29. Quels sont ceux qui sont les plus sujets a entraîner un problème ?

Les groupes de parents []

Les fonctionnaires de la communauté scolaire / []

Les autorités du district []

Les fonctionnaires régionaux []

Les fonctionnaires nationaux []

Autres []

30. Si quelqu'un pose encore un problème, comment réagissez-vous?

31. Avez-vous déjà soulevé une préoccupation concernant la programmation ALISCO à un décideur?

Si oui, décrire le processus.

Si NON, pourquoi pas?

Je n'ai pas eu un problème []

Je ne savais pas comment élever la préoccupation [ ]

Impossible de trouver une personne à l'écoute [ ]

Ne vous sentez pas l'aise de soulever une préoccupation [ ]

32. Quelles problèmes avez-vous vus avec le programme ? Comment est-ce que vous aimeriez les voir résolu ?

CHAPITRE IV : AVIS

33. Dans quelle mesure les communautés influencent les objectifs et la gestion au jour le jour dan les programmes ALISCO? Comment ?

1. Haut

2. Moyenne

3. Faible

4. Aucun

5. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser):

....

....

....

....

34. À votre avis, comment devrait-ils, les programmes ALISCO, être suivis et évalués?

....
....
....

35. À votre avis, quels sont les avantages, le cas échéant, d'impliquer la communauté dans le suivi et l'évaluation (M & E) des programmes ALISCO? (Réponses multiples possibles)

1. DURABILITE ASSURE
2. AMÉLIORE LA QUALITÉ DE L'EVALUATION
3. Contribue à l'autonomisation DES COMMUNAUTÉS LOCALES
4. NONE
5. AUTRES (S'il vous plaît préciser):

....
....
....

APPENDIX C: PROPOSED RESEARCH TOOLS FOR FUTURE USE

1: Policy Maker Survey, English

HGSF SURVEY FOR POLICY MAKERS, MANAGERS AND IMPLEMENTERS

INTRODUCTION

The Partnership for Child Development (PCD) based at Imperial College London is providing support to Governments in selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in response to their requests for technical support to evaluate their national School Feeding Programmes. This instrument is intended to be used to collect data from policy makers and managers and implementers of school feeding (including the home grown school feeding) programmes.

Before the questionnaire is actually administered, we would like to pre-test to ensure that the questions are relevance and comprehensively measure what is intended. We would like to request/invite you, as a Policy Maker [ ], Programme Manager [ ] and/or Implementer [ ], to help us improve this tool by answering all the questions intended for policy makers. At the end of the interview, we would like to briefly discuss your concerns, if any, with regard to, for example, question clarity, phrasing, organization, relevance and coverage. We would be most grateful if you would suggest ways of improving this tool.

Do you have any question before we begin?

Date of interview: Day/Month/Year

Name of interviewer:

Category of respondent:

1. Policy maker / 2. Manager / 3. Implementer/ 4. Community Member: __Parent __ Farmer

SECTION I - GENERAL INFORMATION OF RESPONDENTS

This section asks for general information about you.

1. Gender of respondent: 1. Female / 2.Male

2. What is your place and country of residence?

3. What is your highest educational qualification? (Only one response)

1. None, /2. Primary /3 Secondary (lower) /4. High school (Upper) 5.Post-Secondary/high School [e.g., mid-level – certificate - diploma college); 6. Bachelors degree/6. Masters degree 7. PhD /8. Other (please specify) _____

4. What Organization/Institution do you work for?

5. What is the level of your work operations?

1. National / 2. Regional / 3. District l4. Other (please specify) _____

SECTION II - RESPONDENT KNOWLEDGE, PERCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES OF HOME GROWN SCHOOL FEEDING (HGSF) PROGRAMMES

II - 1.1 RESPONDENT'S KNOWLEDGE

1. What do you know about home grown school feeding? In your view, what are the main benefits of School Feeding Programmes at the community level?

2. In your opinion, what are the benefits of involving the community in the implementation of HGSF?

3. What do you mean by “local food” in HGSF programmes?

4. In your view, what are the added benefits of the home-grown component of SF?

5. In your view, who should provide food to schools in the communities covered by HGSF programmes?

6. In your opinion, what is the best way that donors can support HGSF programmes?

(multiple choice allowed)

1. BY PROVIDING FUNDING □

2. BY PROVIDING TECHNICAL SUPPORT □

3. OTHER. Please specify: □

.....

.....

.....

7. In your opinion, what, if any, factors prevent small farmers from participating in Home Grown School Feeding programmes?

II - 2 RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS

8. In your opinion, what level of government should be responsible for implementing Home-grown School Feeding programmes?

A. National level □

B. Provincial level □

C. District level □

D. Divisional level □

E. School level □

F. Community level □

9. In your opinion, which stakeholders should participate in the implementation of HGSF programmes?

10. What problems have you seen with the HGSF programme? How would you like to see them resolved?

.....

.....

.....

III PARTICIPATION

11. How is the community involved in the design/implementation of the programme?

12. What other mechanisms exist for communication between stakeholders at the regional, district, and community level?

13. When you encounter difficulties in the implementation of HGSF, how can you respond?

14. Who can you contact about your concerns?

15. If your concerns are not met, what are alternative avenues for raising them?

16. Who is most likely to bring a problem to your attention?

Parents groups []

Community/school officials []

District officials []

Regional officials []

National officials []

Other []

II. 3 PRACTICES

17. Are the objectives of the HGSF programme clearly specified in programme documents (e.g. policy/strategy documents)?

1. YES □

2. NO □

If NO, please specify what is missing?

.....
.....
.....

18. Are you following specific guidelines for the implementation of the HGSF programme?

1. YES □
2. NO □
3. DON´T KNOW □

If YES, what guidelines specify the procedures for public procurement of food?
.....
.....
.....

19. What alternative policy, if any, would you suggest for achieving the same goals of HGSF?

.....
.....
.....

20. Who are the key stakeholders involved in the implementation of HGSF?

21. How would you rate coordination between different stakeholders (different Ministries, NGOs, donors) in the implementation of the HGSF and why?

22. How would you rate the coordination between government agencies at different levels (National, District, Community...) in the implementation of the HGSF programme?

23. In your opinion what are the main difficulties experienced in your programme with regard to the implementation of HGSF programmes and why?

24. What is the mechanism, if any, that ensures transparency in the administration of HGSF programmes?

.....
.....
.....

25. Are there guidelines of the HGSF programme that specifically instruct the purchase of locally produced food? □

1. YES

2. NO

3. DON´T KNOW

26. Who is formally designated the responsibility for food procurement? (multiple responses allowed)

1. National authorities □

2. Provincial authorities □

3. District authorities □

4. Community/School authorities □

5. Private firm □

6. No one □

7. Other (please specify)

.....

.....

.....

27. Within the current HGSF programme of your country who is actually procuring food? (multiple choice allowed)

1. National authorities □
2. Provincial authorities □
3. District authorities □
4. Community/School authorities □
5. Private firm □
6. Not defined □
7. Other (please specify)

.....

.....

.....

28. Within the current HGSF programme who supplies the food?

(multiple responses allowed)

1. Large suppliers (National suppliers) □
2. Traders □
3. Caterers □
4. Farmer´s associations □
5. Small farmers □
6. Other (please specify): □

.....

.....

.....

29. What are the roles and responsibilities of the communities in the implementation of the HGSF programme? Do they fulfil these roles?

.....

.....

.....

30. What are the main sources of funding of the current HGSF programme? (multiple choice allowed)

Please indicate approximate percentage:

1. National Government:.....%

2. Donors:..... %

3. NGOs:..... %

4. Communities:..... %

5. Others (please specify):.....%

31. To what extent do donors influence goals setting and the day-to-day management of HGSF programmes? How do they influence goals setting?

1. High □

2. Medium □

3. Low □

4. None □

5. Other (please specify):

.....
.....
.....

32. How, and to what extent do communities influence goals setting and the day-to-day management of HGSF programmes?

33. Is there a defined M&E mechanism/system within the HGSF programme? How does it work?

34. In your opinion, how should HGSF programmes be monitored and evaluated?

.....
.....
.....

35. In your opinion, what are the benefits, if any, of involving the community in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of HGSF programmes?

36. Have you ever raised a concern about a programme in the community to an official or programme manager? If so, how did you do this? How did they respond?

2: Policy Maker Survey, French

ENQUÊTE ALISCO

Date de l'interview: Jour / Mois / Année

Nom de l'enquêteur:

Catégorie du répondant:

1. Décideur / 2. Manager / 3. Mise en œuvre / 4. Membre de la Communauté: __Parent _____ Agricole _

SECTION I - RENSEIGNEMENTS GÉNÉRAUX DES PARTICIPANTS

Cette section demande des renseignements à votre sujet.

1. Le sexe du répondant: 1. Homme / 2. Femme

2. Quel est votre lieu résidence ?

3. Quelle est votre plus haute niveau d'enseignement? (Une seule réponse)

1. Aucun, / 2. Primaire / Secondaire 3 (bas) / 4. d'études secondaires (Haute) 5.Post-Secondary/high école [par exemple, à mi-niveau - certificat - diplôme d'études collégiales); 6. Baccalauréat / 6. Maîtrise 7. PhD / 8. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser) _____

4. Pour quelle institution travaillez-vous?

5. Quel est le niveau de vos opérations de travail?

1. National / 2. Régional / 3. District 4. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser) _____

SECTION II - LES CONNAISSANCES, perceptions et pratiques des programmes d'ALIMENTATION SCOLAIRE A BASE DES PRODUITS LOCAUX (HGSF)

II - LES CONNAISSANCES 1,1

1. Qu'est-ce que vous savez par rapport a l'ALISCO ? À votre avis, quels sont les principaux avantages de programmes d'alimentation scolaire au niveau communautaire ?

2. À votre avis, quels sont les avantages de la participation de la communauté dans la mise en œuvre de HGSF?

3. Qu'entendez-vous par «aliments locaux» dans les programmes HGSF?

4. À votre avis, quels sont les avantages supplémentaires de l'achat local pour l'alisco ?

5. À votre avis, qui devrait fournir de la nourriture aux écoles dans les communautés visées par les programmes HGSF?

6. À votre avis, quelle est la meilleure façon que les bailleurs de fonds puissent utiliser pour soutenir les programmes HGSF?

(Choix multiple possible)

1. FINANCEMENT

2. EN DONNANT le Soutien TECHNIQUE

3. AUTRES. S'il vous plaît préciser:

....

....

....

7. À votre avis, quelles sont les facteurs qui empêchent les petits agriculteurs de participer aux Programmes ALISCO?

II – 2 PERCEPTIONS

8. À votre avis, quel niveau de gouvernement devrait être responsable de la mise en œuvre des programmes d'alimentation scolaire ?

A. Au niveau national ;

B. niveau regional ;

C au niveau du cercle ;

D. niveau de la commune ;

E. niveau de l'école ;

F. niveau communautaire

9. À votre avis, quelles sont les parties prenantes qui doivent participer à la mise en œuvre des programmes Alisco?

10. Quelles interventions complémentaires, le cas échéant, proposeriez-vous pour soutenir les objectifs de HGSF?

III PARTICIPATION

11. La communauté, comment est-elle impliquée dans la conception / mise en œuvre du programme?

12. Quels autres mécanismes existent pour la communication entre les parties prenantes au niveau régional, du district et au niveau communautaire?

13. Lorsque vous rencontrez des difficultés dans la mise en œuvre de ALISCO, comment faites-vous pour y faire face ?

14. A qui vous adressez vous au sujet des préoccupations que vous avez sur le programme?

15. Si vos préoccupations ne sont pas prises en comptes, quelles sont des voies alternatives pour les lever?

16. A quel niveau rencontre t-on le plus de blocages dans la mise en œuvre du programme ?

17. Quand il y a un problème, qui est ce qui habituellement le signale ?

18. Si quelqu'un pose encore un problème, comment réagissez-vous?

II. 3 PRATIQUES

19. Les objectifs du programme ALISCO sont ils clairement spécifiés dans les documents de programme (politique par exemple les documents de stratégie /)?

1. OUI 2. NON

Si NON, s'il vous plaît préciser ce qui manque?

....
....
....
....

20. Suivez-vous les lignes directrices spécifiques pour la mise en œuvre du programme ALISCO?

1. OUI 2. NON 3. NE SAIT PAS

Si OUI, quelles lignes directrices précisent les procédures de passation des marchés publics de la nourriture? .....
....
....
....
....

21. Est-ce qu'il y a les alternatives qui repond mieux aux objectifs de ALISCO?

20. Qui sont les acteurs clés actuellement impliqués dans la mise en œuvre de ALISCO ?

....
....
....
....

21. Comment qualifieriez-vous la coordination entre les différents acteurs (différents ministères, ONG, bailleurs de fonds) dans la mise en œuvre de la ALISCO et pourquoi?

22. Comment évaluez-vous la coordination entre les organismes gouvernementaux aux niveaux différents niveaux (national, district, communautaire ...) dans la mise en œuvre du programme ALISCO?

23. Suivez-vous les lignes directrices spécifiques pour la mise en œuvre du programme ALISCO ?

1. OUI 2. NON 3. NE SAIT PAS

Si OUI, quelles lignes directrices Les lignes directrices précisent les procédures de passation des marchés publics de la nourriture? Si NON, pourquoi pas?
....
....
....
.....

24. A votre avis, quelles sont les principales difficultés rencontrées dans votre programme en ce qui concerne la mise en œuvre des programmes ALISCO et pourquoi?

25. Quel est le mécanisme, le cas échéant, qui assure la transparence dans l'administration des programmes ALISCO?

26. Y a t-il des lignes directrices du programme ALISCO spécifiquement en rapport avec l'achat d'aliments produits localement?

1. OUI

2. NON

3. NE SAIT PAS

27. Qui est officiellement responsable de l'approvisionnement alimentaire? (Plusieurs réponses possibles)

1. Les autorités nationales ;

2. Les autorités régionales ;

3. Les autorités communales ;

4. Cabinet privé

5. Nul

6. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser)

....

....

....

....

28. Dans le programme ALISCO actuel de votre pays qui est en charge de l'approvisionnement en vivres ? (Choix multiple possible)

1. Les autorités nationales ;

2. Les autorités régionales ;

3. Les autorités communales ;

4. Cabinet privé

5. Nul

6. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser)

....

....

....

....

29. Dans le programme actuel qui fournit la nourriture?

(Plusieurs réponses possibles)

1. Les gros fournisseurs (fournisseurs nationaux) ;

2. Les collecteurs régionaux ;

3. Traiteurs

4. Les cooperatives d'agriculteurs ;

5. Les petits agriculteurs ;

6. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser):

....

....

....

....

30. Les communautés, comment sont-elles impliques dans la mise en œuvre du programme ALISCO? Quelles sont leurs roles et responsibilites?

31. Quelles sont les principales sources de financement du programme actuel ALISCO? (Choix multiple possible)

S'il vous plaît indiquez le pourcentage approximatif:

1. Gouvernement national :.....%

2. Les bailleurs de fonds :..... ..... %

3. ONG :..... ..... %

4. Communautés :..... ..... %

Colectivites locales (communes)

5. Autres (précisez s'il vous plaît):..... .....%

32. Dans quelle mesure les bailleurs de fonds influence la determination des objectifs et la gestion quotidienne des programmes ALISCO? Comment influencent-ils la fixation des objectifs?

1. Haut

2. Moyenne

3. Faible

4. Aucun

5. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser):

....

....

....
....

33. Dans quelle mesure les communautés influencent ils les objectifs et la gestion quotidienne des programmes ALISCO? Comment?

1. Haut
2. Moyenne
3. Faible
4. Aucun
5. Autres (s'il vous plaît préciser):

34. Y a-t-il un mécanisme de M&E définie / système dans le programme ALISCO?

35. À votre avis, les programmes ALISCO, comment devraient-ils être suivis et évalués?

....
....
....

36. À votre avis, quels sont les avantages d e l'implication de la communauté dans le suivi et l'évaluation (M & E) des programmes ALISCO?

37. Avez-vous déjà soulevé des préoccupations sur un programme dans la communauté à un fonctionnaire ou responsable de programme? Si oui, comment avez-vous fait? Comment ont-ils réagi?

3: Community Survey, English

Date of interview: Day/Month/Year

Name of interviewer:

Category of respondent group:

Farmers_____ Parents_____ Educators_____ School Management Committee_____

Do the members of the group represent a particular community institution (ie: farmers' cooperative, women's association, etc)? Yes_____ No_____

If Yes, what is its name and what type of organization is it?

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

1. Have you ever heard of School Feeding (SF)?

1. YES [] 2. NO []

If YES, from your point of view, what is school feeding?

.....

.....

.....

What are the goals/benefits of SF? Who benefits?

.....

.....

.....

2. Have you ever heard of Home-grown School Feeding (HGSF)?

1. YES 2. NO

If YES, what is HGSF from your point of view?

.....

.....

.....

What are the goals/benefits of HGSF? Who benefits?

.....

.....

.....

COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE

3. Do you have a SF/HGSF programme in your community? (If NO, continue with the questions from Appendix D)

4. How long has the SF/HGSF programme been here? Who is the main provider of SF/HGSF? What are the main sources of funding of the current HGSF programme?

5. How did the SF/HGSF programme come to be here? What was the process to create the canteen and organize the community and school communities?

6. How is the programme administered? How does it work? What should the program be providing?

7. What kinds of food are available through the program? How often is food served? How often are there deliveries? Should anything be different?

8. Where does the food come from? Who sells/prepares food for the program? How are the cooks organized? Should this change?

9. Who makes decisions about the programme at the local level? What is the process through which these decisions are made?

10. Who makes decisions about the programme at the district level? Who makes decisions about the programme at the national level?

COMMUNICATION

11. Are there regular meetings with the community to communicate about the programme? How often? Who holds these meetings?

12. What other mechanisms exist for communication between stakeholders at the regional, district, and community level?

13. How easy is it for you to find out information about HGSF programming in your area? How did you hear about SF/HGSF? How do you hear about changes in programming?

PARTICIPATION

14. How do you participate in making decisions about or managing the HGSF programme?

15. If you had a choice, how would you change your participation in the programme management?

16. How much power do you have to make/influence decisions about the programme?

PROBLEM SOLVING

17. Describe the problem-solving process for problems with the canteens. Use an example from the programme history.

18. If you cannot resolve the problem at the local level, what do you do next?

19. How much do people listen to and address your concerns?

20. How do you hear about problems in HGSF programming and implementation?

RECCOMENDATIONS

21. What recommendations do you have for the programme?

22. What do you see as the future of the programme? Should the programme continue? How can it be continued?

23. Do you have anything else to add?

4: Community Survey, French

ENQUÊTE ALISCO - Communautaire

Date de l'interview: Jour / Mois / Année

Nom de l'enquêteur:

Catégorie du groupe des répondants:

Parent _____ Agricole _____ Educateur_____ CGS_____

Est-ce que les membres de la groupe représentent un institution communautaire (ex : coopérative des vivriers, association des femmes, etc.) ? Oui_____Non_____

Si oui, quel est son nom et fonctionne ?

CONNAISSANCES GENERALES

1. Avez-vous déjà entendu parler de l'alimentation scolaire (SF)?

1. OUI [] 2. NON []

Si oui, de votre point de vue, qu'est-ce que c'est d'alimentation scolaire? Quelles sont les avantages? Qui sont les beneficiaires du programme?

.....

.....

...

2. Avez-vous déjà entendu parler de l'alimentation scolaire a base des produits locaux (HGSF)?

1. OUI [] 2. NON []

Si OUI, quelle est HGSF à partir de votre point de vue? Quelles sont les avantages? Qui sont les beneficiaires du programme?

.....

.....

....

CONNAISSANCES COMMUNAUTAIRES

3. Avez-vous un programme ALISCO dans votre communauté? (Si NON, continuez avec les questions en annex XX).

4. Depuis combien de temps est-ce que le programme ALISCO est ici? Qui est le partenaire principau pour le financement et fonctionnement du programme? Quelles sont les sources de financement?

5. Qu'est-ce que l'on a fait pour avoir une cantine ici? Quel etait le processus pour creer la cantine et organiser la communaute autour de la cantine?

6. Comment le programme est administré? Comment marche-t-il ? Le programme, quelles choses doit-il donner au communauté ?

7. Quelles types de vivres sont disponibles a travers le programme ? Avec quel périodicité y-a-t-il les repas ? Avec quel periodicite sont les vivres livres? Est-ce qu'il y a besoin de changements ?

8. D'ou vient la nourriture ? Qui vend et qui prépare la nourriture ? Comment les cuisiniers s'organisent? Est-ce que cela doit changer ?

9. Qui prend les décisions au sujet du programme au niveau locau?

10. Qui prend les decisions au niveau cercle? Au niveau national?

COMMUNICATION

11. Y a t-il des réunions régulières avec la communauté de communiquer au sujet du programme? Qui tient ces reunions?

12. Quels autres mécanismes existent pour la communication entre les parties prenantes au niveau régional, du district et au niveau communautaire?

13. Est-ce qu'il est facile pour vous de trouver des informations sur la programmation ALISCO dans votre région? Comment est-que vous avez entendu parler de l'ALISCO? Comment est-ce que vous entendez parler des changements dans le programme?

PARTICIPATION

14. Comment est-ce que vous participer à la prise des décisions et la gestion du programme ALISCO?

15. Si vous aviez le choix, comment auriez-vous modifier votre participation à la gestion du programme?

16. Quelle est votre capacité à influencer ou a prender les décisions au sujet du programme?

RESOLUTION DES PROBLEMS

17. Decrire le processus pour la resolution des problemes au niveau de la cantine. Utilisez un exemple qui a passer dans cette cantine?

18. Si vouz ne pouvez pas resouldre les problemes au niveau locaux, quel est la prochaine etape?

19. Est-ce que les gens écoutent et répondent à vos préoccupations?

20. Comment entendez-vous parler de problèmes dans la programmation et la mise en œuvre ALISCO ?

RECCOMANDATIONS

21. Quels recommandations avez-vous pour le programme?

22. Comment voyez-vous l'avenir du programme? Est-ce que le programme doit continuer? Comment est-ce qu'il peut continuer?

23. Avez-vous d'autres choses a ajouter?

APPENDIX D: RESEARCH TOOLS FOR COMMUNITIES WITHOUT A CANTEEN

1. English

Date of interview: Day/Month/Year

Name of interviewer:

Category of respondent group:

Farmers_____ Parents_____ Educators_____ School Management Committee_____

Do the members of the group represent a particular community institution (ie: farmers' cooperative, women's association, etc)? Yes_____ No_____

If Yes, what is its name and what type of organization is it?

GENERAL KNOWLEDGE

1. Have you ever heard of School Feeding (SF)?

1. YES [] 2. NO []

If YES, from your point of view, what is school feeding?

.....
.....
.....

What are the goals/benefits of SF? Who benefits?

.....
.....
.....

2. Have you ever heard of Home-grown School Feeding (HGSF)?

1. YES 2. NO

If YES, what is HGSF from your point of view?

.....
.....
.....

What are the goals/benefits of HGSF? Who benefits?

.....
.....
.....

COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE

3. Do you have a SF/HGSF programme in your community?

4. Was there ever a SF/HGSF programme in this community? If YES, who funded it? When did it end? Why?

5. If NO, why isn't there an SF/HGSF programme here? Would you want a programme here? What obstacles are there to starting a programme?

6. What would you need to start a programme here? (Organizational and physical needs?)

7. How would a SF/HGSF programme run? How would it work?

8. What is the process to get a SF/HGSF programme? What does the community need to do? Who would they need to talk to?

9. Do you have anything else to add?

2. French

ENQUÊTE ALISCO - Communautaire

Date de l'interview: Jour / Mois / Année

Nom de l'enquêteur:

Catégorie du groupe des répondants:

Parent _____ Agricole _____ Educateur_____ CGS_____

Est-ce que les membres de la groupe représentent un institution communautaire (ex : coopérative des vivriers, association des femmes, etc.) ? Oui_____Non_____

Si oui, quel est son nom et fonctionne ?

CONNAISSANCES GENERALES

1. Avez-vous déjà entendu parler de l'alimentation scolaire (SF)?

1. OUI [] 2. NON []

Si oui, de votre point de vue, qu'est-ce que c'est d'alimentation scolaire? Quelles sont les avantages? Qui sont les beneficiaires du programme?

.....

.....

...

2. Avez-vous déjà entendu parler de l'alimentation scolaire a base des produits locaux (HGSF)?

1. OUI [] 2. NON []

Si OUI, quelle est HGSF à partir de votre point de vue? Quelles sont les avantages? Qui sont les beneficiaires du programme?

.....

.....

....

CONNAISSANCES COMMUNAUTAIRES

3. Avez-vous un programme ALISCO dans votre communauté?

4. Est-ce qu'il y avait jamais un programme ALISCO ici? Si oui, qui l'a finance? Quand est-ce qu'il est fini? Pourquoi?

5. Si non, pourquoi pas? Est-ce que l'on aimerait avoir un programme? Quels sont les obstacles pour un programme ALISCO ici?

6. On a besoin de quoi pour avoir un programme ici? (Les besoins organizational et physiques?)

7. Comment est-ce qu'un programme fonctionnerait?

8. Quel est le processus pour avoir un programme ici? La communaute doit faire comment pour en avoir? Les membres de la communaute doivent parler a qui?

9. Est-ce que vouz avez d’autres choses a ajouter?

APPENDIX E: LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN GHANA CASE STUDY, JANUARY 2011

Name	Organization	Title
S.P. Adamu	GSFP	National Coordinator
Mr. Kingsley Opare	GSFP	Program Officer, Operations
Siiba Alfa	GSFP	Program Officer, Public Relations
Heijia Hannatu A. Kujblenu	GSFP	MIS Officer
Alhassan Adams	GSFP	Logistical Officer
Wasila Sufyan	MoLGRD	Planning Officer
Lambert Abusah	MoFA	Economist
Mr. Bawah N.B	MoFEP	(on steering comm.)
Dora Naa Korkoi Okai	MoH	(on steering comm.)
Mrs. Ellen Mensah	GES	Director, National Co-Coordinator
Ms. Ellen Gyeke	GES	Coordinator for GSFP
Dr. Dorminic Pealore	MoE	Head of M&E Unit
Hon. Alex Nath Tettey-Enyo	MoE	Minister
Francis Sarpong Kumankuma	WFP	Programme Officer
Nguyen Duc Hoang	WFP	Head of Programme
Willem-Albert Toose	Louis Bolk Institute	Regional Manager, West Africa
Samuel Adimado	Ghana Organic Agriculture Network	
Dr. King David Amoah	ECASARD	Director
Steven	ECASARD	Desk Officer for GSFP

Nancy	ECASARD	Finance Officer
Evelyn	GII/TI	Coordinator of TISD
Vitus Azeem	GII/TI	Executive Secretary
Rafael Flo	Millennium Villages Project	Director
Fati Bodua Seidu	SNV	Portfolio Coordinator
Frits Van Bruggen	EKN	Governance Advisor

Also conducted eight focus groups in two different communities, Dodowa and Ga East. In each community, I conducted one focus group with a group of five caterers, five teachers, five parents, and five farmers.

APPENDIX F: LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN MALI CASE STUDY, JANUARY 2011

Date	Community	District	Region	Actor(s)	Canteen	Provider
9-Jan-11	Makno	Douentza	Mopti	CRS agent	yes	CRS
9-Jan-11	Manko	Douentza	Mopti	AE representative	yes	CRS
9-Jan-11	Kourientze	Douentza	Mopti	Agriculture Extension Agent	yes	WFP
9-Jan-11	Mopti	Mopti	Mopti	National Coordinator	Agricultural	
10-Jan-11	Sevares	Sevares	Mopti	CAP Director		
11-Jan-11	Somadougou	Mopti	Mopti	CGS	no	
11-Jan-11	Sirakoro	Mopti	Mopti	CGS	yes	CRS
11-Jan-11	Koloni	Mopti	Mopti	CGS	yes	WFP
11-Jan-11	Soufouroulaye	Mopti	Mopti	CGS	no	
11-Jan-11	Mopti	Mopti	Mopti	Canteen Technician		
12-Jan-11	Barbe	Mopti	Mopti	AME	no	
12-Jan-11	Barbe	Mopti	Mopti	CGS	no	
12-Jan-11	Persugue	Mopti	Mopti	CGS	no	
12-Jan-11	Djinadio	Bankass	Mopti	CGS	yes	WFP
12-Jan-11	Sokanda	Bankass	Mopti	Teachers	yes	CRS
13-Jan-11	Diabolo	Djenne	Mopti	CGS	yes	CRS/WFP
13-Jan-11	Diabolo	Djenne	Mopti	Vendor	yes	CRS/WFP
13-Jan-11	Soala	Djenne	Mopti	Teachers	yes	WFP
13-Jan-11	Soala	Djenne	Mopti	Cooks	yes	WFP

13-Jan-11	Niala	Djenne	Mopti	CGS	yes	GOM
14-Jan-11	Djenne	Djenne	Mopti	Canteen Technician		
14-Jan-11	Taga	Djenne	Mopti	CGS	yes	CRS/WFP
14-Jan-11	Taga	Djenne	Mopti	Elected Officials	yes	CRS/WFP
15-Jan-11	Koyan N'Golobals	Niono	Segou	CGS	no	
15-Jan-11	Colonie Km 26	Niono	Segou	CGS	no	
15-Jan-11	Colonie Km 26	Niono	Segou	AME	no	
16-Jan-11	Macina	Macina	Segou	CAP Director		
17-Jan-11	Bongo	Macina	Segou	CGS	no	
17-Jan-11	Nanabougou	Macina	Segou	CGS	yes	GOM
17-Jan-11	Macina	Macina	Segou	Canteen Technician		
17-Jan-11	Monimpe Bougou	Macina	Segou	CGS	no	
17-Jan-11	Monimpe Bougou	Macina	Segou	Elected Officials	2	GOM
17-Jan-11	Tinema	Macina	Segou	CGS	yes	GOM
17-Jan-11	Tinema	Macina	Segou	Cooks/women	yes	GOM
18-Jan-11	Macina	Macina	Segou	Elected Officials	yes	GOM
18-Jan-11	Zirakoro	Macina	Segou	CGS	no	
20-Jan-11	Bamako	Bamako	Bamako	National Director for Basic Education		
20-Jan-11	Bamako	Bamako	Bamako	National Coordinator for School Canteens		

APPENDIX G: DETAILS ABOUT EXISTING DOWNWARD ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS

Communications strategies are the most common intervention, and provide a community with information about who the intended beneficiaries are and what benefits are spelled out in a program or budget. Programme implementers go to the community to explain what its programming is intended to do and who it is supposed to reach. Some common methods are community meetings, radio broadcasts, posting signs in the service-delivery area (clinic, school, etc), or house-to-house extension work. This strategy typically aims to generate community buy-in, as well as using the community to help monitor progress—since the community can complain if services do not arrive as anticipated. Informing the community of what is going on is the first step toward downward accountability. It recognizes that the constituency has an equal right to know what programming will look like as that of funders and governments.

A communications strategy is a necessary condition for any downward accountability structure, since if the community does not know what to expect or how to communicate with decision makers it cannot truly hold that organization accountable. Its positive points are that it is relatively straightforward to design and simple to implement. Also, many implementers already recognize the importance of communications strategies, which reduces the institutional resistance to implementation. As such, it is an excellent first step towards downward accountability. However, because a communications strategy is both passive and in the design phase, there are limits to how much power it gives the community over its own priorities and decision-making with respect to the intervention. By itself, a communications strategy cannot give complete accountability because if it lacks supporting mechanisms, it may only provide the community with information and fail to take community views into account.

Surveys and community targeting are the most common type of passive design intervention, where a programme implementer uses some set of quantified measures to determine what communities need and which mechanisms might best provide them. This

might help decide where to build a hospital, or what schools most need education interventions. The level of actual communication with the community at this point varies greatly, since it would be possible to use government survey data to design its programming. However, actors may conduct community surveys and needs assessments to determine what needs are at the community level, or which subgroups of the community most need services. By trying to target the population that most falls under its mandate based on actual community statistics, the programme is in some way responding to the idea that it has a particular set of clients that it must serve. On the positive side, these interventions allow implementers to spend money on people who need it most and the services that are most needed. On the negative side, they involve little community involvement and can easily serve as an empty gesture to provide the appearance of accountability without the substance.

Community audits, community-based monitoring and scorecards all give communities a way to rank performance of individual politicians or projects along previously constructed criteria. The tools are designed to be accessible to community members—such as a common method in India of holding town meetings and reading out the formally reported project results and expenditures and asking them to comment on what has actually happened. Communities might also respond to a set of questionnaires about how individual politicians respond to complaints and fulfil commitments. The positives of this approach are that it provides the community a concrete way to offer feedback and engage with the decision-making structure. Negatively, it is more expensive to implement and requires actors to spend a lot of time organizing community meetings and designing a system that community members can easily use and understand. This is especially challenging in largely rural, illiterate populations.

Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) (See Box 1) is a way to track financial data through various levels of government, and uses multiple tools to achieve its results. One of the tools is to ask the community about how money was spent and what services were received at the local level. Other parts of the tool rely on formal report, bank account transfers, and interviews with decision-makers. This method can be extremely successful, but requires a lot of access to information that decision-makers may not wish to release, as well as a long-term and costly commitment to tracking and publicizing data.

Rather than setting a scheme and then asking for participants' help in the enforcement and whistle blowing alone, active design interventions are strategies that involve citizens to set their priorities from the beginning, and thus avoid power concentration and patronage as the primary—or even sole—decision factors.

Participatory Budgeting (See Box 2) is a method first made popular in Brazil. During the government's annual budgeting process, community members assemble to rank and vote on their priorities for projects in the coming fiscal year. The exact methods for ranking and assembling feedback vary, but the basic structure is to allow communities to drive needs, projects, and budgets to suit the community's priorities and hold politicians accountable for responding to those needs. Additionally, because they are involved in the budget process and aware of the resources devoted to each project, the community can react if those commitments are not met.

Participatory budgeting is another practice borrowed from government anti-corruption movements, but it is one that is particularly salient for development programming, especially in the global south. While it is typical for programme staff to set written goals and fundraise accordingly, it would be entirely possible to go to their constituent communities and ask for funding priorities before writing their action plans and seeking out funding. This kind of budgeting does require programmes to be less dependent on a particular donor, and to put a lot of time and effort into the budgeting process, but it also provides a useful vehicle for downward accountability. Rather than letting the type of funding most readily available drive the programming process, this starts from the principle that communities should determine what the priorities are, and raise funds in order to meet those priorities. This intervention requires commitment and risk—since it is a more challenging way to raise money than responding to donor priorities—but it is the most comprehensive way of responding to communities and their needs.

The **Listen First framework** for downward accountability categorizes four main areas of interest—providing public information, participation, listening, and staff attitudes. This is a relatively new tool that NGOs are piloting to try to improve their responsiveness to

communities' needs in their programming and fundraising. A more thorough description of the project, its benefits, and its downsides is concluded in Box 3 below.[xxx]

Examples of Existing Methods

Box 1: Public Expenditure Tracking Survey and Media Access, Success in Uganda[xxxi]

A 1996 Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) in Uganda revealed that for every non-salary dollar that the central government sent to local authorities for education, only 20 cents reached the schools on average for the period from 1991-1995. PETS is founded on asking the community what resources were actually deployed at the local level, and requesting that they serve as watchdogs for accountability. The local media picked up the story, and newspapers all over Uganda spread the information that 80% of education money was not ending up in schools. A repeat PETS in 2001 showed that on average, 82 cents of every dollar reached the schools. This number was higher for communities where teachers and citizens had regular access to media and information, and lower for schools from whom accessible media was more scarce.

Combining a tool for accurately gathering financial information through a complicated decentralized governmental system and mechanisms to spread that information to the community pushed local authorities to put more of the money into schools. As it became apparent that communities would seek punishment for money that was not arriving, and the probability of getting caught and punished rose with more informed communities, local authorities used four times more of the allocated money on schools.

Box 2: Participatory Budgeting for Greater Flexibility and Less Corruption in Porto Alegre, Brazil[xxxii]

In response to a wave of financial difficulties in Brazilian cities, Olivio Dutra first called for

participatory budgeting in 1988 in Porto Alergre to ensure that the government was meeting the needs of the most marginalized groups and spending money appropriately on them. This process allowed the government to build up trust with its citizens, better meet local needs, and reduce corruption perceptions. As one report says: "The growing trust of the population in the democratic budget deliberation process can be seen in the steadily increasing number of participants in the various public meetings since 1989."[xxxiii]

The government of Porto Alegre invested in the needs of its poorest population, building access to sewers and running water, paved roads in the poorest areas, and improved education. Not only did participatory budgeting result in an increase in Porto Alegre's Human Development (HDI) score rising to .86, one of the highest in Brazil, but "[a]dditionally, public forms of lobbying largely put an end to clientelism and corruption."[xxxiv] The transparency and responsiveness not only reduced people's day-to-day experience of corruption, but also their perception of corruption. This practice was awarded a "best practice" award at the UN Habitat Conference in 1996.

Box 3: Listen First: Testing a Downward Accountability Framework in Angola[xxxv]

Concern is an international NGO that works to alleviate poverty and provide development assistance in 50 countries worldwide. It originally started in 1968 sending relief supplies to Biafra during the conflict, and has since expanded to cover many countries and situations. It focus areas are education, emergencies, health, HIV/AIDS, and supporting livelihoods. Concern worked primarily with the support of private donors until 2003, when it started a contract with the Irish government for three years of overall programming support. Since then, it has expanded its fundraising to include many government and multi-lateral donors. This brought the problems of "alien hand" syndrome and a few donors with much power, even as it allowed Concern to expand its programming. As part of this expansion, they reviewed much of the literature about NGO accountability and the attendant problems. Inspired by ActionAid's ALP process, Concern piloted Listen First as a system in Angola in 2008.

The Listen First framework for downward accountability categorizes four main areas of interest—providing public information, participation, listening, and staff attitudes. An NGO is in one of four phases—sapling, maturing, flowering, and fruit bearing—for any one of the four areas. Each area may have a different score. To obtain the organizations' position, the NGO conducts a series of exercises with different levels of stakeholders—management, field staff, community members, etc.—to determine how the different groups view the organization's work. The tool particularly focuses on capturing the views of different stakeholder groups within the community, and so polls women separately from men, and youth as a different category, to assess how well the NGO is meeting the needs of different community members. The NGO then takes the results of all of the evaluations and seriously reconsiders how to structure its systems and values to take those views into account, and move toward the fruit bearing stage on all four areas.

Concern worked with several communities and staff members, and was able to implement the tool successfully. The project identifies two main factors that influence the success of this system: the quality of leadership and support throughout the process and front-line staff's attitude towards the importance of the process. If staff members are supportive and the leadership treats the problem seriously, than the Listen First tool can be quite useful in determining what a community needs and how they interact with the NGO. The NGO can then use this information to shift its priorities and methodologies as necessary. Conducting the reviews periodically allows the NGO to continue its efforts to be downwardly accountable.

The study also identified the risk of further entrenching community power dynamics by failing to interview broad groups of stakeholders. Listen First is successful if it accurately captures the viewpoint of many community members, and not if it only uses the chief or a certain power group as speaking for the entire village. A secondary downside is that an NGO with poor leadership and little or no support from the frontline staff can use the framework to mask the fact that they have no real intention of changing their behaviour but would like to appear to be concerned with downward accountability.

APPENDIX H: GHANA PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES

Programme Objectives

From the outset, GSFP set ambitious goals. The program aimed to:

1) provide one nutritious meal each school day for all infant and primary school children (age 4-12),

2) reach 1.04 million children by 2010,

3) increase the body mass index of target children to a standard level,

4) increase school enrollment of participating schools above the national standard of 83 percent

5) increase attendance by 20 percent and decrease drop out rates by 20 percent,

6) increase income for local farmers,

7) increase production of local farmers through extension of technologies like high-yield seeds and fertilizer,

8) ensure that 40 percent of all schools maintain an agricultural project,

9) increase employment by 8 percent at the community level,

10) increase real income by 8 percent nationwide and ultimately,

11) ensure food security at the community level.[xxxvi]

GSFP intended to achieve its goals by providing one, hot, nutritious meal prepared by locally grown foodstuffs, every day. The menu would use at least 80 percent local food. The program would target the most deprived districts and communities. The implementation would be decentralized, owned by the community and dependent up their participation. Schools would be chosen based low enrolment rates, high drop out rates, low literacy rates, high hunger and vulnerability rates, a high communal spirit and a willingness to provide basic infrastructure (e.g. kitchen, storeroom, latrines).

The GSFP has indeed increased enrolment and investments in the physical infrastructure of schools necessary to run the program, though these increases vary considerably by district. Table 7 shows the increases in primary school enrolment by region, while Table 8 breaks down the differences by gender. [xxxvii]

Moreover, according to the 2010 GSFP Annual Operating Plan, the proportion of schools with potable water increased to 65 percent since the introduction of GSFP. Similarly, the proportion of schools with polytanks increased from 50 percent in 2007 to 75 percent in 2008. Furthermore, the proportion of schools with sanitation and toilet facilities increased from 50 percent to 75 percent during this period.[xxxviii] Despite these noticeable gains, GSFP still suffers from a number of problems. The following section outlines the design of the policy framework and then details existing shortcomings in the framework. It draws from the existing literature as well as interviews at the national, civil society and community level.

APPENDIX I: GHANA ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. National Secretariat Roles and Responsibilities, Source: *District Operations Manual, GSFP*

The National Secretariat, among other things:

- Facilitates the development of a common information, education and communication campaign message and ensure consistency of message.
- Ensures that Districts select beneficiary schools based on agreed criteria.
- Provides periodic audits of DICs and SICs to assure consistency.
- Ensure effective collaboration with MoE on the education component.
- Ensure effective collaboration with MoH on the health component.
- Ensure effective collaboration with MoFA on the agriculture component.
- Ensure effective collaboration with strategic partners.
- Provide sensitization, training and capacity building to implementers.
- Monitor and evaluate the program nationwide.

Since the initial pilot, the GSFP has expanded its roles and responsibilities to include:

- Prepare procurement plans for the feeding program.
- Approve/reject all check lists required to be applied to school selection including community participation.

- Approve District menu plans/options for implementation by schools
- Ensure financial management procedures, account, audits and reporting.

2. District Assembly Roles and Responsibilities, Source: *District Operations Manual*, GSFP

- Identify and designate a staff of the Assembly to serve as a link between the Assembly and the GSFP National Secretariat.
- Open special school feeding bank account into which feeding funds from GSFP/MoLGRD will be lodged.
- The District Finance Officer is responsible for the preparation of quarterly and annual report/accounts to cover all school feeding funds received at the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs)
- MMDAs are also to select schools and caterers based on requirements set out under the Program.
- Ensure that basic infrastructure exists in the school (e.g. kitchen, storage place) before the commencement of cooking.
- Ensure that appointed caterers open bank accounts.
- Payment to the caterers should be strictly by check.
- Interview and appoint caterers and ensure that appointed caterers/matrons are:
    - Capable of cooking food on large-scale basis under hygienic conditions.
    - Able to demonstrate basic understanding of the nutritional needs of children.
- No procurement should be done by the MMDAs on behalf of the caterers.
- The MMDAs should ensure that caterers as much as possible buy/procure from local farmers and producers.
- Encourage Agriculture Extension Officers to assist local farmers to produce for the GSFP.
- Collate information on how GSFP has linked up with farmers at the district level.
- Ensure that there is adequate water for the implementation of the program.
- Collaborate with communities/schools to construct a simple all weather kitchen, store, and canteen with seats and table.
- Facilitate the collection or compilation of baseline and subsequent M&E data on beneficiary schools.
- Arrange with the MoH for periodic de-worming exercise of the school children and regular education in environmental and personal hygiene as well as HIV/AIDS awareness and anti-malaria campaigns.
- Prepare and submit to the GSFP National Secretariat quarterly monitoring reports comprising:
    - Sources and uses of funds statement.
    - Bank reconciliation statement.
- Submit consolidated financial statement to GSFP National Coordinator and the Chief Director of the MoLGRD.

3. Roles and Responsibilities of the DIC, Source: *District Operations Manual*

The DIC is to:

- Ensure that funds are disbursed on time to caterers on receipt from the GSFP Secretariat/MoLGRD.
- Ensure that schools selected meet the criteria for eligibility.
- Promote the GSFP by informing the communities about the program content through community sensitization and encourage their participation in meetings that ensure that the communities commit themselves to the program.
- Ensure that the caterers and cooks have health certificates.
- Ensure the formation and inauguration of SICs.
- Provide required assistance as needed to the SICs in all areas including health, water and sanitation, hygiene, agriculture, and nutrition.
- Follow up on the recommendations, actions, and decisions issued by the MoLGRD and GSFP.
- Monitor the status and achievements of set targets in: 1) the operations of SICs, 2) compliance with audit recommendations at the school level, and 3) any other task assigned by the NS or the MoLGRD.
- Prepare and submit end of term and annual reports on School Feeding Programme activities in the

district to the Regional Coordinator for onward submission to the National Secretariat.

- Conduct Periodic Monitoring of the quality, quantity, and hygienic level of food served by the Caterers and keep records of all such instances of sub-standard food so that it will be taken into consideration in the renewal of the contract of the caterer.

4. Roles and Responsibilities of SIC, Source: *District Operations Manual*

- Collaborate with the head teachers and caterers in providing adequate and nutritious food for the children.
- Prepare term reports on the school feeding activities at the end of each term and each year and submit it to the DA to will inform payment.
- Follow up on recommendations, actions and decisions from the MoLGRD, GSFP, through the DICs.
- Liaise with the DIC in collaboration with District Nutrition Officer to develop a locally and seasonally driven menu to provide nutritionally adequate meals.
- Provider oversight and direct supervision of appointed caterers entrusted with cook ing and feeding.
- Facilitate community involvement, mobilization, and support for the implementation of the program.
- Ensure that soap/detergents are used in washing and cleaning of hands, cooking utensils, cutlery, eating and kitchen facilities.
- Ensure that related equipment (e.g. gas cylinders and burners) used in cooking are kept in good conditions.
- Arrange for security for the kitchen, store, and a canteen.
- Ensure proper maintenance of the physical facilities for cooking and feeding.
- Ensure use of potable water and maintenance of the physical facilities for cooking and feeding.
- Ensure use of potable water and maintenance of good sanitation.
- Report any instances of sub-standard food to the DIC who will take the report into consideration during renewal of the contract for caterers.
- Liaise with DDO and District Health Director to ensure de-worming of the children every six months and education on personal and environmental hygiene as well as HIV/AIDS and Malaria.
- Collaborate to sensitize communities to take ownership of the program.

5. Roles and Responsibilities of Caterers, Source: *District Operations Manual*

- Caterers are totally responsible for purchases and preparation of meals for the children of beneficiary schools.
- The caterer should cooperate with the school authorities in the performance of his/her duties.
- Time for serving of food must under circumstances interfere with instructional time (teaching periods).
- The caterer should purchase local foodstuffs from the community.
- The caterer should and the cooks should undergo medical examination and have a health certificate.
- The caterer shall recruit their own cooks and helpers from the local community and pay them from their own resources.
- The caterer shall be supervised periodically by the GSFP, Desk officers and DICs. Daily supervision of caterers shall also be carried out by the SIC and the school.
- Under no circumstance should any caterer allow pupils to wash their plates before, during or after meals or engage in any labor on the school premises before, during, and after preparation of meals.
- Any caterer, who takes undue advantage of the program resources such as under feeding pupils, poor feeding, etc., shall forfeit his/her contract.

APPENDIX J: HISTORY OF PROCUREMENT PROCESS IN GHANA

Today's procurement process does not at all the process implemented in the initiation of the pilot. When the program was rolled out in 2005, schools were responsible for buying the food. This proved promising in a number of districts. Findings from the WFP report indicate that farmers began expanding their acreage in response to the needs of local schools. For example, in Sene District, Brong Ahafo Region, average farm size before GSFP was 4-5 acres. The introduction of the program increased the average size to 6-8 acres, as GSFP increased demand for locally produced foods. Other districts, like Tolon and Kumbungu, reported the doubling and tripling of farm size in response to the pilot. [xxxix]

This procurement process changed at the end of 2007 in part because the national secretariat argued that the teachers spent too much time procuring and providing the food, and not enough time on their core responsibility—educating. See the table below, which outlines the percentage of a teacher's time spent on the GSFP.[xl]

Time spent	Western	Central	Northern	Upper East	Volta
0-10%	56.5%	84.4%	43.2%	44.4%	63.6%
11-25%	37.1%	9.4%	22.7%	16.7%	12.1%
26-40%	6.4%	6.2%	20.5%	27.8%	12.1%
41-60%	0.0%	0.0%	9.1%	11.1%	9.1%
More than 60%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	0.0%	3.1%
Total no. of schools	63	64	44	18	33

It also changed for a number of other reasons. For example, schools in Ghana are often characterized by weak governance systems—low levels of participation of parents, school management committees and the PTAs. Moreover, the teachers don't have the financial management training to run such a program. For example, the Ghana Integrity Initiative found that 18 percent of head teachers and 72 percent of SMC members have not received financial management training. Three-fourths of schools have inadequate or no financial documentation.[xli] The following three tables show the inadequate infrastructure of schools, making it difficult for schools to provide food in a hygienic and sanitary way.[xlii] It also

means that caterers often cook the food offsite, making it impossible to ensure that the food was prepared in a hygienic and safe way.

Availability of kitchen	Western	Central	Northern	Upper East	Volta
Purpose built	9.70%	26.60%	47.80%	27.80%	22.00%
Temp/shared	56.50%	54.00%	38.60%	61.10%	56.00%
None	33.80%	23.40%	13.60%	11.10%	27.00%

Availability of Dining hall	Western	Central	Northern	Upper East	Volta
Purpose built	6.50%	14.10%	13.60%	0.00%	6.50%
Temp/shared	3.20%	10.90%	2.30%	0.00%	6.50%
None	90.30%	59.40%	84.10%	100.00%	87.00%

Availability of Store	Western	Central	Northern	Upper East	Volta
Purpose built	16.1%	28.1%	31.8%	28.0%	19.0%
Temp/shared	50.0%	40.6%	45.5%	17.0%	55.0%
None	33.9%	31.3%	22.7%	55.0%	26.0%

The caterer model was meant to correct if not mitigate some of these problems. But the caterer model is hardly without problems, as the case shows.

APPENDIX K: BIBLIOGRAPHY

Björkman, M. and Svensson, J. (2009) 'Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-based Monitoring in Uganda.' *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(2): 735-69.

Calland, R. and Neuman, L. (2007) 'Making the Law Work: The Challenges of Implementation.' In Florini, A (Ed.) *The Right to Know: Transparency for an Open World.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Carlitz, R. Background Paper on Budget Processes, Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Caseley, J. (2003) 'Blocked Drains and Open Minds: Multiple Accountability Relationships and Improved Service Delivery Performance in an Indian City.' IDS Working Paper 211. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Catley, A., Burns, J., Abebe, D. and Suji, O. (2007) 'Participatory Impact Assessment: A Guide for Practitioners.' Feinstein International Center, Tufts University. Available at https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Participatory+Impact+Assessment

Collin, M., Zubairi, A., Nielson, D and Barder, O. (2009) 'Costs and Benefits of Aid Transparency.' Wells, UK: aidinfo. Available at http://www.aidinfo.org/files/aidinfo-Costs-and-Benefits-October-2009.pdf

David, R., Mancini, A., Gujit, I. (2006) 'Bringing Systems into Line with Values: The Practice of the Accountability, Learning and Planning System (ALPS). In Eyben, R. (Ed.) *Relationships for Aid*. London: Earthscan.

Fox, J. (2007) 'The Uncertain Relationship between Transparency and Accountability.' *Development in Practice* 17(4): 663-71.

Gauthier, B. (2006) 'PETS –QSDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Stocktaking Study.' Washington, DC: World Bank.

Gaventa, J. and Barrett, G. (forthcoming) 'So What Difference Does it Make? Mapping the Outcomes of Citizen Engagement', Draft IDS Working Paper. Draft available at http://www.drc-citizenship.org/publications/CDRC_Outcomes_Paper.pdf

Glennerster, R. and Shin, Y. (2008) 'Does Transparency Pay?' IMF Staff Papers 55(1): 183-209. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2008/01/pdf/glennerster.pdf

Goetz, A.M. and Jenkins, R. (1999) 'Accounts and Accountability: Theoretical Implications of the Right to Information Movement in India.' *Third World Quarterly* 20(3): 603-22.

Goldfrank, B. (2006) 'Lessons from Latin American Experience in Participatory Budgeting.' Paper Presented at the Latin American Studies Association Meeting, San Juan, Puerto Rico, March. Available at http://www.internationalbudget.org/themes/PB/LatinAmerica.pdf

Hubbard, P. (2007) 'Putting the Power of Transparency in Context: Information's Role in Reducing Corruption in Uganda's Education Sector.' Working Paper Number 136. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. Available at http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/15050/

Jacobs, A. & R. Wilford 2010, 'Listen First: A pilot system for managing downward accountability in NGOs'. *Development in Practice* 20(7): 797-811

Jordan, L. and van Tuijl, P. (2006) *NGO Accountability: Politics, Principles and Innovations*. London: Earthscan.

Joshi, A. Background Paper on Service Delivery, Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

McGee, R. Background Paper on Aid Transparency, Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

McNeil, M. and Malena, C. (2010) *Demanding Good Governance: Lessons from Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

McNeil, M. and Mumvuma, T. (2006) 'Demanding Good Governance: A Stocktaking of Social Accountability Initiatives by Civil Society in Anglophone Africa.' Community Empowerment and Social Inclusion Learning Program. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.

Newell, P. and Bellour, S. (2002) 'Mapping Accountability: Origins, Contexts and Implications for Development.' IDS Working Paper No. 168. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.

ODAC (2006) *The Right to Know, the Right to Live: Turning the Right to Information into a Living Reality.* Cape Town: Open Democracy Advice Centre.

O'Donnell, G. (1998) 'Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies.' *Journal of Democracy* 9(3): 112-26.

Robinson, M. (2006) 'Budget Analysis and Policy Advocacy: The Role of Non-governmental Public Action." IDS Working Paper 279. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Rocha Menocal, A. and Sharma, B. (2008) *Joint Evaluation of Citizens' Voice and Accountability: Synthesis Report*. London: Department for International Development.

Suk Kim, P., Halligan, J., Cho, N., Oh, C.H. and Eikenberry, A.M. (2005) 'Toward Participatory and Transparent Governance: Report on the Sixth Global Forum on Reinventing Government.' *Public Administration Review* 65(6): 646-54.

Sundet, G. (2008) 'Following the Money: Do Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys Matter?'U4 Issue 2008:09. Bergen, Norway: U4 Anti Corruption Resource Centre.

Taylor, P., Deak, A., Pettit, J. and Vogel, I. (2006) 'Learning for Social Change: Exploring Concepts, Methods and Practice.' Workshop Report. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies.

Tisné, M. (2010) 'Transparency, Participation and Accountability: Definitions.' Unpublished Background Note for Transparency and Accountability Initiative.

UN / United Nations (2007) 'Auditing for Social Change: A Strategy for Citizen Engagement in the Public Sector Accountability.' Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and Development Management. New York: United Nations.

Walker, D. (2009) 'Citizen-driven Reform of Local-level Basic Services: Community-Based Performance Monitoring.' *Development in Practice* 19(8): 1035 – 1051.

Wampler, B. (2007) *Participatory Budgeting in Brazil: Contestation, Cooperation, and Accountability*. University Park, US: Penn State Press.

Wampler, B. (2004) 'Expanding Accountability Through Participatory Institutions: Mayors, Citizens, and Budgeting in Three Brazilian Municipalities.' *Latin American Politics & Society* 46(2): 73-99.

World Bank (2004) *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank.

Other articles in the PCD working paper series:

- Home Grown School Feeding: Linking Small Holder Agriculture to School Food Provision HGSF Working Paper 1
- Linking Agricultural Development to School Feeding HGSF Working Paper 2
- Developing Rations for Home Grown School Feeding HGSF Working Paper 3
- Food Provision in Schools: Developing an Evidence-Based Programme HGSF Working Paper 4
- Home Grown School Feeding & Social Protection HGSF Working Paper 5



The working paper series and a wide range of HGSF resources are available for download from www.hgsf-global.org

ENDNOTES

[i] Author's Interview with Kenyan and Ivorian stakeholders and policy makers at the Yamoussoukro School Feeding Colloquium, July 3, 2011.
[ii] Goodin, Robert E. "Democratic Accountability: The Distinctiveness of the Third Sector." *European Journal of Sociology* (2003), 44: 359-396 Cambridge University Press.
[iii] Brown, David L. and Moore, Mark. "Accountability, Strategy, and International Nongovernmental Organizations." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* September 2001 vol. 30 no. 3 569-587.
[iv] McGee, R. Background Paper on Aid Transparency, Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. Pg 12.

[v] Parfitt, Trevor. "The Ambiguity of Participation: a Qualified Defense of Participatory Development." *Third World Quarterly, Volume 25 No 3.* 2004, pg 537-566.
[vi] Oakley, et al. *Projects with People: The Practice of Participation in Rural Development.* International Labor Organization Bureau, Geneva. 1991.
[vii] Rietbergen-McCracken, J. and Nayaran, D. *Participation and Social Assessment: Tools and Techniques.* World Bank. Washington, DC: 1998.
[viii] World Bank (2004) *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Pg 9.

[ix] Björkman, M. and Svensson, J. (2009) 'Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-based Monitoring in Uganda.' *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 124(2): 735-69.

[x] World Bank (2004) *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Pg 9

[xi] World Bank (2004) *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Pg 42.

[xii] Parfitt, Trevor. "The Ambiguity of Participation: a Qualified Defense of Participatory Development." *Third World Quarterly, Volume 25 No 3.* 2004, pg 537-566.
[xiii] Maury, Matthew; Maury, Susan; Power, Grant. "Operationalising Bottom-Up Learning in International NGOs: Barriers and Alternatives." *Development in Practice.* Vol. 12, No. 3/4 (Aug., 2002), pp. 272-284.
[xiv] Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. "Local Capture: Evidence From a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. May 2004, Vol. 119, No. 2, Pages 679-705
[xv] Ebrahim, Alnoor. "Accountability In Practice: Mechanisms for NGOs." *World Development* Volume 31, Issue 5, May 2003, Pages 813-829.
this case study comes from:

Novy, Andreas and Leubolt, Bernhard. "Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Social Innovation and the Dialectical Relationship of State and Civil Society." *Urban Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 11, 2023 – 2036, October 2005.

[xvi] I

bid. pg 2027.

[xvii] Ibid. pg 2031.

on Budget Processes, Review of Impact and Effectiveness of Transparency and Accountability Initiatives". Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies. September 2010.

[xviii] World Bank (2004) *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Pg 9
[xix]Government of Ghana, (2010) "Ghana School Feeding Programme: Annual Operating Plan." Available at http://www.hgsf-global.org/en/bank/comms/doc.../83-gsfp-annual-operating-plan-2010.
[xx] Zan, S. (2008), "Whose Decision Counts?" *SEND GHANA.* Available at http://www.hgsf-global.com/en/.../98-whose-decision-counts-monitoring-report-on-gsfp
[xxi] Agbey, S., Messiba, I., Owusu, L., (2009) "GSFP Social Accountability Project Proposal," *SNV.* Available at http://www.gsf-global.org/en/bank/comms/doc.../83-gsfp-annual-operating-plan-2010.

[xxii] Government of Ghana, (2010) "Ghana School Feeding Programme: Annual Operating Plan." Available at http://www.hgsf-global.org/en/bank/comms/doc.../83-gsfp-annual-operating-plan-2010.

[xxiii]Ghana School Feeding Programme, (2007) "District Operations Manual."
[xxiv] Ghana School Feeding Programme, (2007) "District Operations Manual."
[xxv] Ghana School Feeding Programme, (2007) "District Operations Manual."
[xxvi] Ghana School Feeding Programme, (2007) "District Operations Manual."
[xxvii] Agbey, S., Messiba, I., Owusu, L., (2009) "GSFP Social Accountability Project Proposal," *SNV*. Available at http://www.gsf-global.org/en/bank/comms/doc.../83-gsfp-annual-operating-plan-2010.

[xxviii]SNV, (2007), "Food For Development." Available at www.sign-**school**feeding.org/_.../ GSFP%20Inventory%20Final%20Report%2009122007.doc
[xxix] Author's Interview with Deaconess Mojirola Adepoju, the Osun State School Feeding Coordinator at the Yamoussoukro School Feeding Colloquium, July 3, 2011
[xxx] Jacobs, Alex and Wilford, Robyn. "Listen First: a pilot system for managing downward accountability in NGOs." *Development in Practice*. Volume 20, Number 7, September 2010.
[xxxi] Information for this case study comes primarily from the articles:
Dehn, Jan, Ritva Reinikka, and Jakob Svensson. "Survey Tools for Assessing Performance in Service Delivery." In François Bourguignon and Luiz A. Pereira da Silva, eds., *The Impact of Economic Policies on Poverty and Income Distribution: Evaluation Techniques and Tools*. A copublication of the World Bank and Oxford University Press. 2003.
Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. "The Power of Information: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign to Reduce Capture." World Bank Working Paper. December, 2003
Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. "Local Capture: Evidence From a Central Government Transfer Program in Uganda" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. May 2004, Vol. 119, No. 2, Pages 679-705
[xxxii] Information in this case study comes from:
Novy, Andreas and Leubolt, Bernhard. "Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre: Social
Innovation and the Dialectical Relationship of State and Civil Society." *Urban Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 11, 2023 – 2036, October 2005.
[xxxiii] Ibid. pg 2027.
[xxxiv] Ibid. pg 2031.
[xxxv] Jacobs, Alex and Wilford, Robyn. "Listen First: a pilot system for managing downward accountability in NGOs." *Development in Practice*. Volume 20, Number 7, September 2010.
[xxxvi] Government of Ghana, (2010) "Ghana School Feeding Programme: Annual Operating Plan." Available at http://www.hgsf-global.org/en/bank/comms/doc.../83-gsfp-annual-operating-plan-2010.

[xxxvii] Ghana School Feeding Programme, (2007) "District Operations Manual."
[xxxviii] Ibid
[xxxix] Ibid
[xl] Ibid
[xli] Ibid
[xlii] Ibid